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Abstract
For a secure communication through the public network, cryptographic encryption
must be applied. T h e key establishment issue is the most important part in cryptographic encryption. Only the legitimate principals w h o have the key can encrypt
messages and decrypt cryptograms. A secure multi-party communication held through
the public network can only take place after a multi-party key establishment protocol
has been executed. T h e multi-party key establishment protocol is designed so that the
principals can receive a c o m m o n key and use it to securely exchange the messages.
In this thesis, the secure multi-party key establishment protocols are discussed. W e
start from investigating properties of two-party key establishment protocols such as
motivation of using session key, adversaries in the protocols, attacks of the protocol
and security analysis of the protocol. Then we give the requirements of a multi-party
key establishment protocol and summarize about what should be considered in designing a multi-party key establishment protocol. After that we review some of the
previous proposed multi-party key establishment protocol. T h e existing multi-party
key establishment protocols are either impractical ( not efficient enough) or missing
some important security goals such as authentication of principals. Three new protocols are proposed in this thesis. The first protocol addresses how to hold a conference
for members of two hierarchical groups in an efficient way. The message broadcasting
is used to reduce the cost of secure message transport.
The second and the third protocols manage the authentication problem by using
a secret sharing scheme. W e replace the principal authentication with the group authentication so that the computational overhead and communication overhead will be
reduced especially in reuse of the protocol for new communication. Again, message
broadcasting is used for replacing the expansive secure communication channel.
Part of this thesis appeared in ACSC'99(Australian Computer Science Conference)
and ACISP'99(Australian Conference of Information Security and Privacy).
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Basic Notation

Most of the notation used in this thesis is defined in the text. Here are listed notation
for which this is not done.
Exclusive-or (of Booleans)
©

V
A

A n d (of Booleans)

/

Not (e.g., ^ denotes "not equal")

u
n

Set union

G

Set membership

V\A
AcV

T h e set of elements in V but not in A
A is a subset of V, A ^ V

ACT

A is a subset of V

1

Such that (set notation)

a\ b

a divides b (a, b e N )

\A\
N, Z, R

The cardinality of set A

II

Concatenation

2A
2X

The set of all subsets of set A

\x]
[x\
[a]

Smallest integer greater than x

[x,y]

A n interval (a subset of set ]R)

%a

The set of integers modulo a

l0ga

Logarithm to base a

£

Summation

n

Multiplication

Or (of Booleans)

Set intersection

The set of natural numbers, integers and reals,respectively

Raising 2 to power x

Greatest integer smaller than x
A reference (used in bibliography)

iii

Mapping
The number of subsets of cardinality t of a set of cardinality n
Congruence
Factorial (e.g., n! = 1 x 2 x • • • x n)
T h e Galoisfieldwith p elements
a set of possible keys
a set of possible messages
a set of possible cryptogram
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Information protection covers not only secrecy (a traditional protection against eavesdropping) but also authentication, integrity, verifiability and other more specific security countermeasures. Cryptography deals with the design of algorithms, protocols
and systems for solving two kinds of security problems: privacy and authentication.
More precisely, cryptography is the use of transformations of data intended to make
the data useless to opponents, but meaningful to legitimate receivers. T h e only secret
part of almost all modern cryptographic systems is the key - the parameter that selects
the particular transformation to be employed. So there is a clear need to provide the
secrecy of such sensitive information.
K e y establishment is one of the major problems in communication and network
security. From the security point of view, most networks can be thought as insecure
networks, in that anyone connected to the network will have access to all the information that flows through it. This leads to m a n y problems related to the confidentiality
and authenticity of information that is transmitted through the network. Encryption
is often employed in a network to protect information confidentiality. If a conventional
private-key cryptosystem, such as D E S , is used then it is necessary to distribute keys
to the network users in a secure fashion.
K e y establishment is a process by which two (or more) entities establish a shared
key. T h e key is subsequently used to achieve some cryptographic goal such as confidentiality or data integrity. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of key establishment
protocols: key transport protocols in which a key is created by one principal and securely transmitted to the other principal (principals), and key agreement protocols in
which two or more parties contribute information which jointly establishes the shared
secret key.
Multi-party (conference) key establishment protocol is a protocol that used a m o n g a
number of principals w h o connected through an insecure communication network such
as the Internet, to establish a c o m m o n key which can be later used to ensure secure and
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authenticated communication. While the Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol
and its extensions for two-party one have been well studied, designing a multi-party
key establishment protocol can be particularly challenging because of the complexity
of the interactions between the m a n y principals. Over the years, m a n y multi-party key
establishment protocols have been proposed [34, 64, 40, 45, 20, 43, 18, 41, 43, 19, 17,
48, 29, 37, 11, 12, 35, 68, 79, 80, 2]. They, however, suffer from either inefficiency, or
lack of some security goals.
This thesis is devoted to the design and analysis for multi-party key establishment
protocols.

1.1 Security Goals of Key Agreement

The fundamental goal of any key establishment protocol is to distribute keying data
securely. Ideally, the established key should have precisely the same attributes as a key
established face-to-face; for example, it should be shared by (two) specified principals,
it should be distributed uniformly at random from the key space and no unauthorized
principal should learn anything about the key. A protocol achieving this idealistic
goal could then be used as a replacement for face-to-face key establishment in much
the same way as that a pseudo-random bit generators replaced random bit generators.
Unfortunately, such an abstract goal is not easily achieved and it is not an easy task
to identify and enunciate the precise security requirements of key establishment.
Diffie and Hellman [26] in their seminal paper m a d e several breakthroughs in cryptology. Apart from introducing the notion of public key cryptography, they showed
how two principals, A and B, can establish a c o m m o n key. Suppose that principals
A and B wish to establish a secret key via an insecure network using a public discussion. They follow the following protocol: A and B use a modulus p (p is a large
enough prime) and a primitive element g G Z*. Both integers p and g are public. A
and B also randomly chose a and B from Z*, respectively. Then the two principals
exchange the following sequence of messages: A sends ga
g&

(mod p) to B and B sends

(mod p) to A. At the end of the protocol, both A and B can compute a c o m m o n

secret key as k = {g^)a = {gaY = ga^

(mod p). However, the protocol suffers from

the intruder-in-the-middle attack. Suppose that the attacker E, sits between A and B.
After A sends B a message (ga
message (g7

(mod p)), E intercepts it and forwards to B his own

(mod p)), where 7 € Z*v is an integer chosen by E. Again, E intercepts

the message g&

(mod p) and sends [g1

(mod p)) to A. Finally, A computes its secret
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key kA = (g-r)a and B calculates its secret key kB = (g7f. Clearly, the secret keys
computed by A and B are different. Note that E knows kA and kB and controls the
message exchange between A and B.
This attack leads to the so-called authenticated key agreement (AK) problem. It is
desirable to use the authenticated key agreement protocol instead of the key agreement
protocol. In other words, in the authenticated key agreement protocol, principals give
an assurance called entity authentication so that the keying information sent to them
is authenticated by the sender. After completing the protocol, A and B are sure
that they have the same authenticated key which is computed from the authenticated
keying information and their o w n secret. T h e attacker can not compute the same key
with A and B because he/she cannot know the secret of A and B even he/she knows
the authenticated keying information. Clearly, this problem is harder than the key
agreement problem in which A does not care with w h o m and what key he/she agrees.
Several techniques related to the Diffie-Hellman problem have been proposed to
provide the solution for the A K problem (e.g. Matsumoto, Takashima and Imai, Diffie
[51], van Oorschot and Wiener [27], Blake-Wilson and Menezes [6]). However, few
practical solutions have been provably demonstrated to achieve this goal, and this
deficiency has lead in m a n y cases to the use of flawed protocols. The flaws have, on
occasion, taken years to discover; at best, such protocols must be employed with the
fear that such flows will later be uncovered.
Since in the A K problem, A merely desires that only B can compute the key, and
not that B has actually computed the key, solutions are often said to provide implicit
(key) authentication. If A wants to make sure in addition that B really has computed
the agreed key, then key confirmation is incorporated into the key agreement protocol,

leading to the so-called explicit authentication. The resulting goal is called authenticate
key agreement with key confirmation (AKC). Entity authentication essentially adds the
assurance that A really is communicating with B according to the A K protocol. Thus
the goal of key confirmation is similar to the goal of entity authentication. More
precisely, the incorporation of key confirmation into the A K protocol provides A the
additional assurance that B can compute the same key and makes the protocol become

AKC.
T h e above arguments concerning two-party key establishment protocol also apply
to the multi-party key establishment protocol. That is, the issue of authentication in
designing multi-party key establishment protocol is still challenging.

J

-2. Efficiency in Multi-party Key Establishment

1.2

4

Efficiency in Multi-party Key Establishment

When moving from two-party to multi-party key establishment protocols and the efficiency issue should be taken into account because of the complexity of the interactions
between the m a n y principals. B y efficiency w e means the computational complexities
for each principal and communication overhead in the protocol. Indeed, the multi-party
key establishment becomes a major hurdle in computer network with m a n y users. T o
show the scale of the problem, assume that a computer network encompasses n users.
If any pair of users is to be allow to communicate in a secure way using symmetric key
encryption, then it m a y be necessary to generate and distribute

n\ _ n(n — 1)
2
2) ~
different keys. If some network (cryptographic) services involve more than two users
(for example a secure conferencing with i = 2,..., n), the number of possible keys to
be distributed can grow exponentially in n as

If the keys cannot be pre-distributed, then they have to be established them on requ
whenever there is a collection of parties w h o want to share the same key.
O n the other hand, considering the extensions of Diffie-Hellman key establishment
protocol, it should be pointed out that the multi-party protocols do not capture the
simplicity of the two-party one. In two-party model, each principal needs only to
exchange one piece of information and a set of public parameters (public keys of principals). However, when an attempt is m a d e to extend this two-party model to multiparty model, the exchange of messages become m u c h more complicated. There are
more messages needed to be exchanged. Thus another challenge for current research
interests in the area is to improve the efficiency of the existing protocols, such as
the Burmester-Desmedt protocol [11]. Burmester and Desmedt considered a variety of
conference key agreement protocols which are suitable for some specific communication
network configurations. Their protocols enable an efficient key agreement but without
authentication of the parties involved. Just and Vaudenay [35] showed some attacks
on the Burmester-Desmedt protocols and gave alternative protocols which provide key
authentication, key confirmation and forward secrecy.

1.3. Contributions

1.3

5

Contributions

This thesis concerns with multi-party key establishment protocols. Three multi-party
(conference) key establishment protocols are designed. In thefirstprotocol, the focus is on having a conference for principals (members) w h o belong to the hierarchical
structure groups. T h e effort is to reduce the communication overhead and the c o m m u nication cost of the conference. It only needs communication overhead of key exchange
between two managers to start a conference between m a n y members. There is no
communication overhead between members. After two managers exchange the key, the
group members can gain necessary information that is broadcast by managers through
the public channel to compute the key and have a conference. T h e managers still have
the advantages of the hierarchical structure through which they can monitor the conference and assign the participation of new members as they wish in a low cost and
efficient way.
The second and the third protocols are based on the group authentication property
of secret sharing scheme. O n e is the key transport type and the other is the key
agreement type. Both of them used the group authentication to solve the problem
of lack of entity authentication in some multi-party key establishment protocols, such
as the one proposed by Burmester and Desmedt [11]. From the key transport type
protocol w e designed, n e w principals can be added and old principals can be removed
by share modification of their original share.
In the key agreement protocol designed, the computational secure secret sharing is
used as a base after the system was initially set-up. T h e enrollment, dis-enrollment
and even changing the n e w c o m m o n key can be obtained through the public channel,
thus reducing the cost of the conference key establishment protocols.

1.4 Organization of Thesis

Chapter 2 provides some cryptographic background used in the protocols. This include
the introduction of private and public key cryptography, hashing, digital signature and
secret sharing scheme.
Chapter 3 states the goals, requirements and the methods used in designing the
multi-party key establishment protocols.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of previous proposed multi-party key establishment
protocols.

1.4. Organization of Thesis
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T h e remaining chapters describe our designs of multi-party key establishment protocols. Chapter 5 describes a efficient key agreement protocol between two hierarchical
groups. T h efinalversion of paper appeared in ACSC'99(Australian Computer Science
Communications Conference). The idea is that after the top levels of two groups exchanged a c o m m o n conference key, the members of the groups could join a conference
when they received the go-ahead ticket. The ticket was broadcast by the top levels.
This protocol reduced the communication overhead between members and the cost of
using the secure channel to transport the conference key between top level and low
level members.
Chapter 6 describes a key agreement multi-party key establishment protocol based
on secret sharing scheme. Within this protocol, the help of the dealer is unnecessary.
Principals can have a conference key established from the joining information. The
key cannot be predicted before all principals broadcast their extra shares. The final
version of paper appeared in ACISP'99(Australian Conference of Information Security
and Privacy).
In chapter 7 we designed a key transport type protocol which based on secret sharing
scheme for multi-party key establishment. The advantages of this protocol are fusing the group authentication to replace the individual principal authentication, 2)the
protocol can be reused in an efficient way when the member's state of the conference
changed.
Chapter 8 states direction of future work and some enhancements of our protocols.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries

This chapter provides an introduction to the topics of cryptography that will be used
the subsequent chapters. Cryptography is concerned with the construction of schemes
which are robust against malicious attempts to make these schemes deviate from their
prescribed functionality. Given a desired functionality, a cryptographer should design
a scheme which not only satisfies the desired functionality under "normal operation",
but also maintains this functionality in face of adverse attempts which are devised after
the cryptographer has completed his/her work.
Focusing on the general encryption problem, let us consider two parties, a sender
and a receiver, w h o wish to communicate securely with each other via an insecure
channel which is controlled by an eavesdropper. Encryption schemes can be divided
into two categories: private key or symmetric schemes and public key or asymmetric
schemes. In a private key scheme, the same key is used for encryption and decryption.
Hence, w h e n two parties want to communicate securely with a symmetric encryption
scheme, they need to exchange a private key in advance. In a public key scheme, two
different keys are used for encryption and decryption. T h e key used for encryption,
the public key, can be published, while the secret key used for decryption must be kept
secret. A n advantage of this is while the key for a symmetric encryption scheme must
be exchanged securely, the public keys need to be exchanged only authentically - a
m u c h weaker requirement.
Both private key and public key encryption schemes consist of three algorithms: key
generation, encryption and decryption. T h e difference between these two encryption
schemes is reflected in the definition of security. T h e security of a public key encryption
scheme should hold also when the adversary is given the encryption key, whereas this
is not required for a private key encryption scheme, because public key encryption
schemes allow each user to broadcast his/her encryption key. A n y user m a y send
his/her encrypted messages to other users without agreeing on a private encryption
key in advance.

7
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Private Key Cryptography

A private-key cryptosystem enables two parties, the sender and the receiver, to co
municate in secrecy via an insecure channel. Before any communication of messages
takes place, both the sender and receiver must exchange the secret key K G JC via
a secure channel, which can be implemented using a messenger or a registered mail.
After exchanging the key, the sender can select a message M e M, apply the encryption algorithm E

:M

x JC -» C, and dispatch the cryptogram C = EK(M)

through

the insecure channel. T h e receiver, w h o knows the secret key K (in modern cryptographic systems the encryption/decryption algorithms are publicly known), recreates
the message from the cryptogram using D

: C x JC ->• M, that is, M —

DK{C).

The encryption system works correctly if

DK(EK(M)) = M
for all keys K G JC. T h e best-known private-key cryptosystem which is used nowdays
is the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm [61], which was developed at I B M
in the mid 70s.

2.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography was invented in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman and was introduced in their paper entitled " N e w Directions in Cryptography" [26]. Their basic
framework is as follows
1. Find a computationally intractable problem T,
2. Build a cryptosystem based on T. Breaking the system is equivalent to solving
instances of the intractable problem T.
Let {Ee : e G JC} be a set of encryption transformations and let {Dd : d G JC] be the
set of corresponding decryption transformations, where JC is the key space. Consider
any pair of associated encryption/decryption transformations (Ee,Dd)- Suppose that
each pair has the property that knowing Ee and giving a random ciphertext c G C,
it is computationally infeasible to find the message m G M

such that Ee(m)

= c.

This property implies that, given e, it is infeasible to determine the corresponding
decryption key d. Ee is viewed here as a trapdoor one-way function, d is the trapdoor
information needed to compute the inverse function of Ee. Here a trap-door one way
function means that it is easy to compute but hard to invert unless a trapdoor is known.

2.2. Public Key

Cryptography
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Under these assumptions, consider the two-party communication between Alice and
Bob. B o b selects the key pair (e, d) and sends the encryption key e (called the public
key) to Alice over any channel but keeps the decryption key d (called the private key)
secure and secret. Alice can subsequently send a message m to B o b by applying the
encryption transformation determined by Bob's public key e to get c = Ee(m).

Bob

can then decrypt the ciphertext c by applying the inverse transformation Dd uniquely
determined by d. That is, m — Dd(c).
Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryption and decryption
transformations Ee : e G JC and Dd : d G JC, respectively. The encryption method is
said to be a public key encryption scheme if for each associated encryption/decryption
key pair (e, d), one key ,e (the public key), is m a d e publicly available, while the other,
d (the private key), is kept secret.
It appears that the public-key scheme (PKS) is an ideal system, not requiring a
secure channel to pass the encryption key. This would imply that two entities could
communicate over an unsecured channel without ever having met to exchange keys.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. It can be shown how an active adversary can defeat the system (decrypt messages intended for a second entity) without breaking the
encryption system. This is a type of impersonation. In this scenario, the adversary impersonates entity B by sending entity A a public key, e', which A assumes (incorrectly)
to be the public key of B. The adversary intercepts encrypted messages from A to B,
decrypts with its o w n private key, d', re-encrypts the message under B's public key,
e, and sends it on to B. This highlights the necessity to authenticate public keys to
achieve data origin authentication of the public keys themselves. A must be convinced
that he/she is encrypting under the legitimate public key of B.

2.2.,1 Advantages/Disadvantages of Public Key Cryptos
The advantages of public key cryptosystems include:
1. Only the private key must be kept secret (authenticity of public keys must, however, be guaranteed).
2. The administration of keys on a network requires the presence of only a conditionally trusted Trusted Third Party(TTP) as opposed to an unconditionally
trusted T T P . Depending on the m o d e of usage, the T T P might only be required
in an "off-line" manner, as opposed to in real time.

2.2. Public Key Cryptography
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3. Depending on the mode of usage, a private key/public key pair may remain
unchanged for considerable periods of time, e.g., m a n y sessions (even several
years)
4. Many public-key schemes yield relatively efficient digital signature mechanisms.
T h e key used to describe the public verification function is typically m u c h smaller
than it for the symmetric-key counterpart.
5. In a large network, the number of keys necessary may be considerably smaller
than in the symmetric-key scenario.
The disadvantages of public key schemes include:
1. Time needed for message encryption and decryption for the most popular publickey encryption methods are several orders of magnitude slower than the best
known symmetric-key schemes.

2. Key sizes are typically much larger than those required for symmetric-key encryption, and the size of public-key signatures is larger than that of tags providing
data origin authentication from symmetric-key techniques.
3. No public-key scheme has been proven to be secure. The most effective publickey encryption schemes found to date have their security based on the presumed
difficulty of a small set of number-theoretic problems and/or other hard problems.
4. Public-key cryptography does not have as a extensive history as symmetric-key
encryption, being discovered only in the mid 1970s.

2.2.2 Some Public Key Encryption Schemes
In this section there is a short introduction of some public key encryption schemes.

The RSA Encryption Scheme
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [67] were one of the threefirstto propose a concrete
realisation of a trap-door one-way function as introduced by Diffie and Hellman[26].
It is based on the difficulty of computing e-th roots modulo a composite n, known as
the R S A problem. Given a positive integer n, which is a product of two distinct odd
primes p and q, a positive integer e such that gcd{e, (p - l)(q - 1)) = 1, and an integer
c, find an integer m such that me = c (mod n). The R S A encryption scheme works
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as follows. Let p and q be two safe primes (p = 2p' + 1, q = 2q' + 1 and p' and g'
also are primes), n — pq, and let e be an integer satisfying gcd(e,<p(n)) = 1, where
(p(n) = (p — l)(q - 1). The public key of a recipient, Bob, is the pair (n, e). His secret
key is the triple (p,q,d), where d satisfied de — 1 (mod </>(n)). To encrypt a message
m G [0,..., n — 1] for Bob, a sender Alice computes
c = me (mod n)
and sends c to him. Bob can recover m using the secret value d follows:
m = cd (mod n).
The correctness of this encryption method is seen as follows:
cd = (me)d = m (mod n)
holds since ed = 1 (mod <p(n)).
The security of the scheme is based on the R S A problem. However, there are some
pitfalls that can make the system insecure. For instance, when e is chosen as a small
number for reasons of efficiency, a number of attacks are possible. Hastad showed
that when encrypting the same message for multiple recipients having the same public
exponent e but a different modulus, the message can be computed from the cipher-texts
without knowing any of the corresponding secret keys[32]. Furthermore, if polynomial
relations among the encrypted messages are known, messages can also be recovered

[22]. Such attacks can be prevented by salting, i.e., appending a random bit-string to
the message before encryption.
The ElGamal Encryption Scheme
• The following encryption scheme was proposed by ElGamal [28]. It can be seen as
a special way of using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Let G be a finite
cyclic group of order q and let g G G be a generator of G such that computing discrete
logarithms in G is infeasible. In the original proposal, G was chosen to be Z* (thus we
have ord(g) =p — l) where p is a large prime. In order to encrypt a message m G G for
Bob having the public key y = gx, Alicefirstchooses a randomly in Zq and computes
the pair (A, B) = (ga, yam) being the cryptogram of m. Bob, knowing the secret key
x, can receive the message m by calculating
B
yam _ gxam
A* ' qax
gax
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Alternatively, the role of the public key and the base can be interchanged and
become the following variant. Now a message can be encrypted by randomly selecting
an a in Zq and computing the pair (A,B) = (ya,gam). Decryption is performed by
calculating
B
gam
gam
. _, =
rr =
= rn
AX

1

ydX

L

Q<1

In both schemes, the security is based on the assumed intractability of the DiffieHellman problem. Note that these are probabilistic encryption schemes. Furthermore,
if a different a is used for every encryption, it is equivalent to the Decision Diffie-

Hellman problem [3] to decide whether two pairs (A, B) and (A', B') both encrypt th
same message m.

2.2.3 Other Public-Key Cryptosystems
Almost all existing group-oriented cryptosystems, which are the subject of investigation
for this thesis, utilise either the R S A or the ElGamal public-key cryptosystems. For
the sake of completeness, we give an overview of some other public-key cryptosystems
that are introduced in the literature of public-key cryptography.
The Merkle-Hellman Cryptosystem
The Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem[56] wasfirstdescribed by Merkle and Hellman in

1978. Although this cryptosystem utilises the knapsack problem, which is itself believed
to be a difficult problem in number theory, the cryptosystem was broken by Shamir[72].
There is also a version of the Merkle-Hellman system, called the iterated MerkleHellman system. All variants of this cryptosystem were broken in the early 1980's.
Readers interested in the details of breaking the Merkle-Hellman system are referred
to the book by O'Connor and Seberry[60].
McEliece Cryptosystem
McEliece[52] suggested utilising error-correcting codes in the design of a public-key
cryptosystem. The purpose of an error-correcting code is to correct random errors
that occur in the transmission of binary data through a public channel. This system,
however, has not been studied well since error-correcting codes require data expansion
that is not desirable in cryptographic systems. Another problem with this cryptosystem
is that it is not suitable for producing signatures.
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Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
T h e R S A and ElGamal cryptosystems utilise cyclic groups which exist in their underlying algebraic structures. Since elliptic curves can be applied in cyclic groups,
they can be used in cryptographic applications. T h e idea of applying elliptic curves
in cryptography is due to Koblitz [38] and Miller [58]. K o y a m a , Maurer, Okamoto
and Vanstone [42] proposed an elliptic curve variant of the R S A system. Menezes,
Okamoto and Vanstone [54] proposed an elliptic curve variant of the ElGamal system.
They showed that if the elliptic curve belongs to a special family called super-singular
curves (a super-singular curve is an affine equation, y2 = x 3 + ax + b, over GF(q) with
a,b G GF(q),Aa3 + 27b2 ^ 0, together with an additive identity O ) , then the discrete
logarithm problem in the elliptic curve group can be reduced in expected polynomial
time to the discrete logarithm problem in a small extension of the underlying finite
field. Hence, if a super-singular curve is desired in practice, then it should be chosen
carefully.

2.3 Hashing and Digital Signature Schemes
2.3.1 Hashing
There are several cryptographic applications which require the production of a short
fingerprint (or a digest) of a m u c h longer document/message. Cryptographic applications of hashing include, amongst others, the generation of digital signatures and
message authentication codes1.
A hashing function h, in general, is a procedure that takes as input a message, M,
of arbitrary length and produces a digest, h(M), of a fixed length. In order to assess
the security of a hash function, a commonly used criterion is the collision freeness
property. A hash function h is called collision free iffindingmessages Mx and M 2 with
h(Mx)

- h(M2) is a hard problem [24]. A formal definition of a collision free, also

called strong one-way hash function, h, is given as follows:
1. h can be applied on any message or document, M, of any size.
2. h produces a fixed size digest h(M).
headers w h o are interested in message authentication codes are referred to the book by Pieprzyk
and Sadeghiyan [66].
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3. Given h a n d M , it is easy to compute h(M), but it is computationally intractable
to find the message M for the given digest h(M), that is, h is one-way.
4. Given the description of the hash function h, it is computationally infeasible to
find two distinct messages Mx and M2 which collide, i.e., h(Mx) = h(M2).

That

is, h is collision free2.
Several constructions of hash functions (for different purposes and with different
levels of security) have been proposed in the literature (see, for example, [69], [88] and
[66]).

2.3.2 Digital Signatures
Hand-written signatures have been used in everyday situations such as writing a letter,
signing a contract and withdrawing m o n e y from a bank. Since a copy of a handwritten signature can usually be distinguished from an original, the signer cannot deny
the original signature. This is w h y the signature is used to take the responsibility of
the signer for signed messages.
O n e of the greatest achievements of modern cryptography is the digital signature.
Digital signatures should be in a sense similar to hand-written signatures. Since a
copy of electronic documents is identical to the original, digital signatures have to
create some sort of digital encapsulation for the document so that any interference
with either its contents or the signature will be detected with a very high probability.
In order to achieve this requirement, a digital signature on a message is a special
encryption of the message that can be applied only by the legitimate signer. That is,
in contrast to hand-written signatures, which are independent from the messages, the
digital signatures must somehow bind to the message.
O f course, in both hand-written and digital signature schemes a third party, (the
receiver of the signature), must be able to verify the signature. A hand-written signature is verified by comparing it to other, authentic signatures. For example, in order
to withdraw m o n e y from a bank, the bank compares the signature with one which is
provided at account opening time. Verification of a digital signature, however, needs
the application of a particular (in general, a publicly known) algorithm. So, a digital signature scheme is a collection of two algorithms and must have the following
properties:
2

Obviously there are m a n y collisions for a hash function h, since the message source is m u c h larger
than the digest source.
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1. T h e signing algorithm SigK : ) C x M - > A assigns a signature A =
where M

G M

SigK(M),

is a message, K G JC is the secret key of the signer and A is the

set of all possible values of the signatures.
2. T h e signing algorithm executes in polynomial time when the secret key K is
known. For an opponent, w h o does not know the secret key, it should be computationally intractable to forge a signature, that is, to find a valid signature for
a given message.
3. T h e verification algorithm Vk :

fcxMxA->

{yes, no} takes a public information

k G JC of the signer, a message M G M. and a given signature A G A of the message
M . It returns "yes" if A is the signature of the message M, otherwise it returns
"no".
4. The verification algorithm, in general, is a publicly known (polynomial time)
algorithm. So, anyone can use it to check whether a message M

matches the

signature a or not.

2.4 Secret Sharing Schemes

This section will illustrate the basic concepts of threshold secret sharing scheme
the related modification needed in our conference key distribution protocols.

2.4.1 Basic Concepts
A simple example can be used to illustrate the concept of secret sharing. For instance,
in a bank there is a vault that will be opened every day by three senior tellers but a
single teller is not to be trusted to open it. So the bank has to decide how to open it
safely. They would like to have a way that any two of the tellers can open the vault
but no single teller can open it. This is a (2,3) threshold secret sharing scheme.
Assume that there is a key set JC and the key K

G JC, and V is the set of n

principals. There is also a dealer D, D £V, w h o chooses the key K and assigns the
shares a m o n g the n principals. If the number of principals in B is equal or greater than
t, \B\>t, principals in B can find out the key K. If less than t, principals cannot find
any information of the key K.
Formally, let t, n be positive integers, t < n. A (t, n)-threshold scheme is a method
of sharing a key K a m o n g a set of n principals (denoted by V), in such a way that any
t principals can compute the value of K but no group of t - 1 principals can do so.
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Threshold secret sharing schemes werefirst,independently, introduced by Shamir
[71] and Blakley [9]. They have been widely investigated in the literature (for example,
A s m u t h and B l o o m [1], Karnin et al [36], Mignotte [57], Kothari [39], Blakley and
M e a d o w s [8], M e a d o w s [53], D e Soete and Vedder [77], Stinson and Vanstone [83],
Laih et al [44], S i m m o n s [75, 74] and Blakley et al [7]). For a survey on different
schemes refer to S i m m o n s [76] and Stinson [81].
A secret sharing scheme m a y have the following properties:
1. Perfect: A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if all subsets of principals that
do not form a qualified set are unable to obtain any information about the secret
or about shares of other principals. Such schemes are also called information theoretically secure. There are also computationally secure secret sharing schemes,
where it is infeasible to compute the secret for any subset not in a qualified set

(e.g. [15]).
2. Ideal: A perfect secret sharing scheme is called ideal if the size of the shares
equals the size of the secret.

3. Verifiable: A secret sharing scheme is called verifiable if each principal can verify
that he/she has indeed obtained a valid share, i.e., the dealer need not be trusted.
Such a scheme wasfirstproposed by Chor et al. [21]. Verifiable secret sharing
schemes require a third algorithm ver, that takes as input a share, and outputs
true if and only if the share is valid. Hence, the principals can convince themselves
that the shares are valid. Schemes that also allow other entities to validate the
shares of all principals are called publicly verifiable [78].

2.4.2 Shamir Threshold Scheme
Here is a brief review the Shamir threshold scheme [71]. T h e Shamir (t, n) threshold
scheme is based on polynomial interpolation. Given t points in the two-dimensional
plane (xx, y\),..., (xt, yt) with distinct rc^'s, there is one and only one polynomial f(x)
of degree at most t — 1 such that yi = f(xi) for all i. T h e Lagrange interpolation
formula is as follows:
1=1 j = l Xl XJ

Let the secret be an element of afinitefield,that is, K G GF(p), where p is a prime
number. Since polynomial interpolation is possible over GF(p),
following algorithm for constructing a (t, n) threshold scheme.

Shamir suggests the

2.4. Secret Sharing Schemes

17

Set-up Phase:

1. The dealer, D, chooses n distinct and non-zero elements of Zp, denoted x\,..., x
and sends Xj to Pj via a public channel.
2. D secretly chooses (independently and randomly) t — \ elements of Zv, denoted
ax,..., at_! and forms the polynomial
t-i

f(x) = K + J2aixii=l

3. For 1 < i < n, the dealer computes Sj, where
s{ = f(x{) (mod p).
4. D gives (in private) share s* to principal Pj.
Secret Reconstruction Phase:
Every subset of V, which has at least t principals can apply the Lagrange interpolation
formula to reconstruct the polynomial and hence to recover the secret.
The principals do not need to reconstruct the polynomial f(x). The secret is the
constant term of the polynomial, that is, K = /(0). So, they can recover the secret
using:

* = 5>;II—3^j=\

X%k

fc=i

(2.2)

(mod p).

Xl

3

A n alternative method of secret reconstruction is to solve linear equations in Zv.
Every set of at least t principals can always form the following system of equations:
K + aiXn + a2x2x H

V a^x-f1

= sn

K + aixi2 + a2x22 H

h at-ix^1

= si2

t-i
h at-Xx
it

K + aixu + a2x\t -I

= sit

This can be written as:
/ 1

Xft

x

2
1 Xn
xi2
i2 X

x

Xn
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1 K \

i2

( 8, \
Si2

Ol

=

^ 1
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xit

4"1) V

at l

~)

\Sit J

2.4. Secret Sharing Schemes

18

T h e leftmost matrix is a so-called Vandermonde matrix and its determinant detA is
given by the following formula:

deM= ]J (xij-Xik)l<k<j<t

Since all x;'s are distinct, no term (xtj - xik) is zero. Thus the determinant of a
Vandermonde matrix over afinitefieldis always non-zero and the above system of
equations has a unique solution over Zp. That is, every set of at least t principals can
uniquely reconstruct the polynomial and hence recover the secret.
Note.

T h e size of GF(p) must be large enough such that the selection of distinct and

non-zero elements x^'s is possible. That is, the required condition for constructing a
Shamir (t, n) threshold scheme is that the prime number p (the size of the field) must
be greater than n (the number of principals in the system).

2.4.3 Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme
O n e problem of secret sharing schemes is that they are not secure against cheating
principals w h o send false shares when the secret is to be recovered. Another problem
is that a cheating dealer could distribute false shares, so that different groups of principals recover different secrets. Such problems arise in protocols for secure multi-party
computations (see e.g. [4]), and can be solved with verifiable secret sharing (VSS)
schemes [21].
T h e object of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is to resist malicious principals w h o
are
1. A dealer sending incorrect shares to some or all of the principals, and
2. Principals submitting incorrect shares during the reconstruction stage.
A VSS scheme is a secret sharing scheme with an additional, interactive or noninteractive algorithm which allows the principals to verify the validity of their shares.
In other words, all groups of principals recover the same value if their shares are valid
and this unique value is the secret if the dealer was honest.
In V S S scheme, the principals can verify the validity of only their o w n share but
they cannot k n o w whether other principals (with w h o m they might be able to recover
the secret) have also received valid shares. This problem can be solved with publicly
verifiable secret sharing (PVSS).
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T h efirstrealization of V S S , is presented in [21] and achieves security against cheating principals. T h e verification protocol allows the honest principals to ensure that they
can recover a unique secret. T h e V S S , presented in [21], has the very special property
that not only the principals, but everybody is able to verify that the shares have been
correctly distributed.

Model for PVSS

This section gives an informal description for secret sharing, verifiable secret shari
and publicly verifiable secret sharing. It must be recalled that a secret sharing scheme
consists of a dealer, n principals Px, • • •, Pn, and an access structure A C 2^'"'nJ. T h
access structure is monotone, which means that if A G A and AC

B then B e A. For

instance, in a threshold secret sharing scheme with threshold k, the access structure
is defined as A = {A G 2^1''"'n^||A| > k], which means that any coalition of at least k
principals can recover the secret.
T o share a secret s a m o n g the principals, the dealer runs an algorithm Share
Share(s) = (sx,-- •, sn)

to compute the shares. The dealer then sends each share s; secretly to Pi, i = 1, • • •
If a group of principals wants to recover the secret, they run an algorithm Recover,
which has the property that
VA G A : Recover({si\i G A}) = s,

and that for all A £ A it is computationally infeasible to calculate s from {si\i G .A}
Thus, only those coalitions of principals belonging to the access structure A are able
to recover the secret s.
In V S S scheme, an additional, possibly interactive algorithm Verify which allows
the principals to verify the validity of their shares:
3uVA G A: (Vz G A: Verify(si) = 1) => Recover({si\i G A} = u),
and u = s if the dealer is honest.
In a P V S S scheme, a public encryption function Et is assigned to each principal Pit
such that only he knows the corresponding decryption function £>*. T h e dealer n o w
uses the public encryption functions to distribute the shares by calculating
S{ = Ei(si),i = !,-••, n
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and publishing the encrypted shares Si. To verify the validity of all the encrypted
shares, there is an algorithm Pub Verify with the property that
3uVA G 2<1,'"'n> :
(PubVerify({Si\i G A}) = 1) =* Recover({Di(Si)\i G A}) = u
and u = s if the dealer is honest. In other words, if a set of encrypted shares is "good"
according to Pub Verify, then the honest principals can decrypt them and recover the
secret. Note that PubVerify can be executed even if the principals have not received
their shares so far. T o run PubVerify, it m a y be necessary to communicate with
the dealer (but not with any principal). A P V S S scheme is called non-interactive
if PubVerify requires no interaction with the dealer at all.
Example for non-interactive PVSS
In [70], a special P V S S scheme is proposed which can be extended to m a n y different
applications. T h e basic scheme is given below:
Assumption
Let Gq denote a group of prime order q, such that computing discrete logarithms
in this group is infeasible. Let g, G denote independently selected generators of Gq.
hence no party knows the discrete log of g with respect to G.
Protocols
They use the protocol proposed by C h a u m and Pedersen [16] as a sub-protocol
to prove that logpi hx = \ogg2h2, for generators gx,hx,g2,h2 G Gq. This protocol is
denoted by DLEQ(gx,

hx,g2, h2), and consists of the following steps, where the prover

knows a such that hx = gxa and h2 = g2a:
1. The prover sends ax = gxu and a2 = g2u to the verifier, with u eR Zq.
2. The verifier sends a random challenge c G# Zq to the prover.
3. The prover responds with r = u - ac(modq).
4. The verifier checks that ax = gxhx and a2 = g2rh2c.
Initialization
The group Gq and the generators g,G are selected using an appropriate public
procedure, principal Pt generates a private key X; eR Z* and registers Yt = GXi as its
public key.
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Distribution
T h e protocol consists of two steps:

1. Distribution of the shares. Suppose that the dealer wishes to distribute a secr
a m o n g principals Px, • • •, Pn. T h e dealer chooses a random polynomial p of degree
at most t — 1 with coefficients in Zq:

p(x) = tJ2^Jxj,
j=0

and sets s = Qo- The dealer keeps this polynomial secret but publishes the related
commitments Cj = gai, for 0 < j < t. T h e dealer also publishes the encrypted
shares Yi — y?^

for 1 < i < n using the public keys of the principals. Finally,

let Xi = ]lj=o CjtJ. T h e dealer shows that the encrypted shares are consistent by
producing a proof of knowledge of the unique p(i), 1 < i < n, satisfying:

Xt = g^ ,Yi = yf®.
The non-interactive proof is the n-fold parallel composition of the protocols for
DLEQ(g,Xi,yi,Yi).

Applying Fiat-Shamir's technique, the challenge c for the

protocol is computed as a cryptographic hash of Xi,Yi,aXi, a2i, 1 < i < n. The
proof consists of the c o m m o n challenge c and the n responses r;.
2. Verification of the shares. The verifier computes Xi = nj=o ^i values. Using
Yi, X{, Yi, ri, 1 < i < n and c as input, the verifier computes an, a2i as
axi = grtXf, a2i = ypYf,
and checks that the hash of Xi, Y{, ati, a2i, 1 < i < n, matches c.
Reconstruction
T h e protocol consists of two steps:
1. Decryption of the shares. Using his/her private key x{, each principal P{ finds
the share S{ = Gv{i) from Y{ by computing Si = Yxlxi. They publish Si plus a
proof that the value Si is a correct decryption of Yi. To this end, it suffices to
prove knowledge of an a such that Y{ = Ga and Yi = Sf, which is accomplished
by the non-interactive version of the protocol DLEQ(G,

yi, Si, Yi).
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2. Pooling the shares. Suppose that principals P» produce correct values for Si, for
% — 1, • • • ,t. T h e secret Gs is obtained by Lagrange interpolation:

n S* = f[(Gp{i))Xi = Gm = Gs
i=i

where Aj = Ylj^i ^

»=i

is a Lagrange coefficient.

Note that the principals do not need to learn the values of the exponents p(i). Only
the related values Si = Gp^ are required to complete the reconstruction of the secret
value S = Gs. Also, note that principal Pi does not expose his/her private key
x^, consequently principal Pi can use his/her key pair in several runs of the P V S S
scheme. T h e type of encryption used for the shares has been optimized for performance;
however, if desired, it is also possible to use standard ElGamal encryption instead [70].

2.5 Cryptographic Protocols

A cryptographic protocol is an algorithm defined by a sequence of steps precisely specifying the actions required for two or more entities to achieve a specific objective (see
[55]).
Protocols play a major role in cryptography and are essential in meeting cryptographic goals such as privacy, confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication or
identification, message authentication, signature and authorization.
A protocol failure occurs w h e n a mechanism fails to meet the goals for which it
was intended, in a manner whereby an adversary gains advantage not by breaking an
underlying primitive such as an encryption algorithm directly, but by manipulating the
protocol or mechanism itself [55],
Three reasons that can cause the failure of protocols are:
1. Weaknesses in a particular cryptographic primitive which m a y be amplified by
the protocol or mechanism;
2. Claimed or assumed security guarantees which are overstated or not clearly understood; and
3. T h e oversight of some principle applicable to a broad class of primitives, such as
encryption.
W h e n designing cryptographic protocols and mechanisms, the following two steps
are essential:
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1. Identification of all assumptions in the protocol or mechanism design; and
2. For each assumption, determination of the effect on the security objective if that
assumption is violated.

Chapter 3
Multi-Party Key Establishment Protocol
This chapter addresses the overview of the multi-party key establishment protocol.
Firstly, some general topics such as the motivation, the adversary and the analysis of
the key establishment protocol are discussed. Then the requirements of the conference key establishment protocol are listed. Finally, the design of the conference key
establishment protocol is given.

3.1 Key Establishment Protocol
The role of public-key encryption in privacy communications is that public-key encryption is used as a means of exchanging keys for subsequent use in symmetric-key
encryption, motivated by performance differences between symmetric-key and publickey encryption.
In cryptography, key establishment is one of the most important issues for securing
communication. It deals with the problems of h o w to establish an authenticated secret
key between two or more principals on a public communication channel with public
messages. In this context, authentication can be viewed as a process between legitimate
principals (senders and receivers) to ensure data integrity and to provide data origin
authentication. So a principal must be able to verify, either directly or indirectly, that
messages received have originated from legitimate senders and that they have not been
altered or substituted for fraudulent ones.
Key management

is the set of processes and mechanisms which support key es-

tablishment and the maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between principals,
including replacing older keys with n e w keys as necessary.
Key establishment is a process or protocol whereby a shared secret becomes available
to two or more principals, for subsequent cryptographic use.
Key establishment m a y be broadly subdivided into key transport and key agreement
[55].
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A key transport protocol is a key establishment technique where one principal creates or obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s).
A key agreement protocol is a key establishment technique in which a shared secret
is derived by two (or more) principals as a function of information contributed by, or
associated with, each of these, (ideally) such that no principal can predetermine the
resulting value.

3.1.1 Motivations for Using Session Keys
Key establishment protocols allow the principals of the protocols to share secrets which
are called, or used to derive, session keys. Ideally, a session key is an ephemeral secret,
i.e., one whose use is restricted to a short time period such as a single telecommunications connection. T h e motivation for use it are as follows:
1. T o limit available ciphertext(under a fixed key) for cryptanalytic attack;
2. To limit exposure, both time period and quantity, of data if (session) key compromised;
3. T o avoid long-term storage of a large number of distinct secret keys (in the case
where one principal communicates with a large number of others), by creating
keys only w h e n actually required;
4. T o create independence of communications sessions or applications;
5. It is also desirable in practice to avoid the requirement of maintaining static
information across sessions.

3.1.2 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Apart from founding public-key cryptography, Diffie-Hellman [26] also proposed a concrete scheme for obtaining a c o m m o n private key using a public channel. This private
key can then, for instance, be used for encryption with a symmetric encryption algorithm.
T h e scheme works as follows. Let G be a finite cyclic group of order q and let
g G G be a generator of G such that computing discrete logarithms in G is infeasible.
Furthermore, let ya = gXa and yb = gx» be the public keys of two parties, Alice and
Bob, and let xa and xb be their respective secret keys. T o derive a c o m m o n secret
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key k, Alice and B o b exchange their public keys over the public channel and raise the
partner's public key to the power of their o w n secret key and thereby get
k = yaXb = ybXa = gXaXb,
which is the common private key.
This protocol suffers from the intruder-in the middle attack(see section 1.1). T h e
parties can establish a secret key but they do not know with w h o m they share it! T h e
protocol provides no key authentication and no key confirmation.
Several protocols try to fix the problems in Diffie-Hallman key exchange protocol,
such as ElGamal key agreement protocol, M T I protocols [51], the station to station
protocol [27]. Recently, Law, Menezes, Q u , Solinas, Vanstone [46] , proposed a new and
efficient two-pass protocol for authenticated key agreement in the public-key setting.
T h e protocol is based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement and can be modified to work in
an arbitraryfinitegroup and, in particular, elliptic curve groups. T w o modifications
of this protocol are also presented: a one-pass authenticated key agreement protocol
suitable for environments where only one party is on-line, and a three-pass protocol in
which key confirmation is additionally provided.

3.1.3 Protocol Characteristics
W h e n designing or selecting a key establishment technique for use, it is important to
consider what assurances and properties an intended application requires. Characteristics of different key establishment techniques include:
1. Nature of the authentication. Any combination of the entity authentication, key
authentication and key confirmation m a y be provided.
2. Reciprocity of authentication. When reciprocity of authentication provided, each
of entity authentication, key authentication, and key confirmation m a y be unilateral or mutual provided to one or both principals, respectively.
3. Key freshness. A key is fresh (from the viewpoint of one principal) if it can be
guaranteed to be new, as opposed to possibly an old key being reused through
actions of either an adversary or authorized principal.
4. Key control. In key transport protocols, one principal controls the key value. In
key agreement protocols, the key is derived from joint information, and it m a y
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be desirable that no single principal be able to control or predict the value of the
key.
5. Efficiency. Considerations include:
• Number of message exchanges (passes) required between principals;
• Bandwidth required by messages (total number of bits transmitted);
• Complexity of computations by each party (as it affects execution time);
and
• Possibility of pre-computation to reduce on-line computational complexity.
6. Third party requirements. Considerations include:
• Requirement of an on-line (real-time), off-line or no third party;
• Degree of trust required in a third party (e.g., trusted to certify public keys
vs. trusted not to disclose long-term secret keys).
7. Type of certificate used, if any. More generally, one may consider the manner by
which initial keying material is distributed, which m a y be related to third party
requirements, (such as public key certificate of principals)
8. Non-repudiation. A protocol may provide some type of receipt to ensure that the
keying material has not been exchanged.

3.1.4 Adversaries in Key Establishment Protocols
Communicating parties or entities in key establishment protocols are formally called
principals, and are assumed to have unique names. In addition to legitimate principals,
the presence of an unauthorized "third" party is hypothesized. This third party is given
m a n y names under various circumstances, including: adversary, intruder, opponent,
enemy, attacker, eavesdropper, and impersonator.
W h e n examining the security of protocols, it is assumed that the underlying cryptographic mechanisms used, such as encryption algorithms and digital signatures schemes,
are secure. If otherwise, then there is no hope of a secure protocol. A n adversary is
hypothesized to be not a cryptanalyst attacking the underlying mechanisms directly,
but rather one attempting to subvert the protocol objectives by defeating the manner
in which such mechanisms are combined, i.e., attacking the protocol itself.
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A passive attack involves an adversary w h o attempts to defeat a cryptographic technique by simply recording data and thereafter analyzing it (e.g., in key establishment,
to determine the session key). A n active attack involves an adversary w h o modifies or
injects messages.
It is typically assumed that protocol messages are transmitted over an insecure channel(e.g. unprotected (open) networks), modeled by an adversary able to completely
control the data therein, with the ability to record, alter, delete, insert, redirect, reorder and reuse past or current messages and inject new messages. T o emphasize this,
legitimate principals are modeled as receiving messages exclusively via intervening adversary (on every communication path, or on some subset of any paths). A n adversary
has the option of either relaying messages unaltered to the intended recipients or carrying out (with no noticeable delay) any of the above actions. A n adversary m a y also
be assumed capable of engaging unsuspecting authorized principals by initiating new
protocol execution.
A n adversary in a key establishment protocol m a y pursue m a n y strategies, including
attempting to:
1. Deduce a session key using information gained by eavesdropping;
2. Participate covertly in a protocol initiated by one party with another, and influence it, e.g., by altering messages so as to be able to deduce the key;
3. Initiate one or more protocol execution (possibly simultaneously), and combine (interleave) messages from one with another, so as to masquerade as some
principals or carry out one of the above attacks;

4. Without being able to deduce the session key itself, deceive a legitimate principal
regarding the identity of the principal with which it shares a key.
Distinction is sometimes made between adversaries based on the type of information
available to them. A n outsider is an adversary with no special knowledge beyond that
generally available, e.g., by eavesdropping on protocol messages over open channels.
A n insider is an adversary with access to additional information (e.g., session keys or
secret partial information), obtained by some privileged means (e.g., physical access
to private computer resources, conspiracy, etc.). A one-time insider obtains such
information at one point in time for use at a subsequent time; a permanent insider has
continual access to privileged information.

3.1. Key Establishment Protocol

3.1.5

29

Perfect Forward Secrecy and Known-Key Attacks

In analyzing key establishment protocols, the potential impact of compromise of various
types of keying material should be considered, even if such compromise is not normally
expected. In particular, the effect of the following is often considered:
1. Compromise of long-term secret (symmetric or asymmetric) keys,.if any;
2. Compromise of past session keys.
A protocol is said to have perfect forward secrecy if compromise of long-term keys
does not compromise past session keys.
T h e idea of perfect forward secrecy (sometimes called break-backward protection) is
that previous traffic is locked securely in the past. It m a y be provided by generating
sessions keys by Diffie-Hellman key agreement, wherein the Diffie-Hellman exponential
is based on short-term keys. If long-term secret keys are compromised, future sessions
are nonetheless subject to impersonation by an active adversary.
A protocol is said to be vulnerable to a known-key attack if compromise of past
session keys allows either a passive adversary to compromise future session keys or
impersonation by an active adversary in the future.
Known-key attacks on key establishment protocols are analogous to known-plaintext
attacks on encryption algorithms. O n e motivation for this consideration is that in some
environments (e.g., due to implementation and engineering'decisions), the probability
of compromise of session keys m a y be greater than that of long-term keys. A second
motivation is that w h e n using cryptographic techniques of only moderate strength, the
possibility exists that, over time, extensive cryptanalytic effort m a y uncover past session keys. Finally, in some systems, past session keys m a y be deliberately uncovered for
various reasons (e.g., after authentication, possibly to detect use of the authentication
channel as a covert or hidden channel).

3.1.6 Analysis of Key Establishment Protocol
T h e primary aim of protocol analysis is to establish confidence in the cryptographic
security of a protocol. T h e most obvious objectives and properties of key establishment
protocols are namely authenticity and secrecy of keys.
A key establishment protocol is operational (or compliant) if, in the absence of
active adversaries and communications errors, honest principals w h o comply with its
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specification always complete the protocol having computed a c o m m o n key and knowledge of the identities of the principals with w h o m the key is shared.
A key establishment protocol is resilient if it is impossible for an active adversary
to mislead honest principals as to thefinaloutcome.
Protocol analysis should confirm that a protocol meets all claimed objectives. A s
a m i n i m u m , for a key establishment protocol, protocol analysis should include being
operational (note this implies no security guarantees), providing both secrecy and authenticity of the key and being resilient. Key authenticity implies the identities of
the principals sharing the key are understood and corroborated, thus addressing impersonation and substitution. Resilience differs subtlety from authentication and is a
somewhat broader requirement. Additional objectives beyond authenticated key establishment m a y include key confirmation, perfect forward secrecy, detection of key
reuse, and resistance to known-key attacks.
In addition to verifying objectives are met, additional benefits of analysis include:

1. Explicit identification of assumptions on which the security of a protocol is based

2. Identification of protocol properties and a precise statement of its objectives(thi
facilitates comparison with other protocols and determines appropriateness);
3. Examination of protocol efficiency (with respect to bandwidth and computation).

Essentially all protocol analysis methods require the following (implicitly or explic
1. Protocol Specification - an unambiguous specification of protocol messages, when
they are sent, and the actions to be taken upon reception thereof;
2. Goals - an unambiguous statement of claimed assurances upon completion;
3. Assumptions and Initial State - a statement of assumptions and initial conditions;
4. Proof - some form of arguments that, given the assumptions and initial state,
the specified protocol steps lead to afinalstate meeting the claimed goals.

Analysis Methods
C o m m o n approaches for analyzing cryptographic protocols include the following:
1. ad hoc and practical analysis. This approach consists of any variety of convincing
arguments that any successful protocol attack requires a resource level (e.g., time
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or space) greater than the resources of the perceived adversary. Protocols which
survive such analysis are said to have heuristic security, with security here typically in the computational sense and adversaries assumed to havefixedresources.
Arguments often presuppose secure building blocks. Protocols are typically designed to counter standard attacks and are shown to follow accepted principles.
Practical arguments (paralleling complexity-theoretic arguments) involving constructions which assemble basic building blocks m a y justify security claims.
While perhaps the most commonly used and practical approach, it is in some
ways the least satisfying. This approach m a y uncover protocol flaws thereby
establishing that a protocol is bad. However, claims of security m a y remain
questionable, as subtle flaws in cryptographic protocols typically escape ad hoc
analysis; unforeseen attacks remain a threat.
2. reducibility from hard problems. This technique consists of proving that any successful protocol attack leads directly to the ability to solve a well-studied reference
problem, itself considered computationally infeasible given current knowledge and
an adversary with bounded resources. Such analysis yields so-called provably secure protocols, although the security is conditional on the reference problem being
truly (rather than presumably) difficult.
A "challenge in this approach is to establish that all possible attacks have been
taken into account and these can in fact be equated to solving the identified
reference problems. This approach is considered by some to be as good a practical
analysis technique as any that exist. Such provably secure protocols belong to
the larger class of techniques which are computationally secure.
3. complexity-theoretic analysis. An appropriate model of computation is defined,
and adversaries are modeled as having polynomial computational power (they
m a y m o u n t attacks involving time and space polynomial in the size of appropriate
security parameters). A security proof relative to the model is then constructed.
T h e existence of underlying cryptographic primitives with specified properties
is typically assumed. A n objective is to design cryptographic protocols which
require the fewest cryptographic primitives or the weakest assumptions.
A s the analysis is asymptotic, care is required to determine when proofs have
practical significance. Polynomial attacks which are feasible under such a model
m a y nonetheless in practice be computationally infeasible. Asymptotic analysis
m a y be of limited relevance to concrete problems in practice, which have finite
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size. Despite these issues, complexity-theoretic analysis is invaluable for formulating fundamental principles and confirming intuition.
4. information-theoretic analysis. This approach uses mathematical proofs involving entropy relationships to prove protocols are unconditionally secure. In some
instances, this includes the case where partial secrets are disclosed (e.g., for unconditional security against coalitions of fixed size). Adversaries are modeled to
have unbounded computing resources.
While unconditional security is ultimately desirable, this approach is not applicable to most practical schemes for several reasons. These include: l)many
schemes, such as those based on public-key techniques, can at best be computationally secure; and 2)information-theoretic schemes typically either involve keys
of impractically large size, or can be used only once. This approach cannot be
combined with computational complexity arguments because it allows unlimited
computation.
5. formal methods. So-called formal analysis and verification methods include logics
of authentication (cryptographic protocol logics), term re-writing systems, expert
systems and various other methods which combine algebraic and state-transition
techniques. T h e most popular protocol logic is the Burrows-Abadi-Needham
( B A N ) logic [13, 14]. Logic-based methods attempt to reason that a protocol
is correct by evolving a set of beliefs held by each party, to eventually derive a
belief that the protocol goals have been obtained.
This category of analysis is somewhat disjoint from thefirstfour. Formal methods
have proven to be useful infindingflaws and redundancies in protocols, and some
are automatable to varying degrees. O n the other hand, the "proofs" provided
are proofs within the specified formal system and they cannot be interpreted as
absolute proofs of security. A one-sidedness remains: the absence of discovered
flaws does not imply the absence of flaws. S o m e of these techniques are also
unwieldy, or applicable only to a subset of protocols or classes of attack. M a n y
require (manually) converting a concrete protocol into a formal specification, a
critical process which itself m a y be subject to subtle flaws.
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Requirements of Multi-Party Key Establishment
Protocol

Usually the objective of key establishment protocol is to establish a shared key between
two principals. If the number of principals are more than two, it is called multiparty (conference) key establishment protocol. Although the objective of these two
protocols are the same, they are different w h e n evaluated for efficiency and security .
Multi-party key establishment protocols are usually designed to achieve a welldefined collection of goals and simultaneously one would expect that they can be run
efficiently. T h e main collection of security goals for multi-party key establishment
protocols [55] are : (1) key freshness, (2) entity authentication, (3) key confirmation,
(4) key authentication and (5) explicit key authentication.
• A key is fresh if it has not been generated or used before.
• Entity Authentication is a confirmation process which allows one principal to
identify correctly the others involved in the protocol. Typically, it allows a principal to check whether other principals are active (alive) at the time when the
protocol is being executed.
• Key Confirmation is a property of protocol which allows one principal to make
sure that the other parties possess the same c o m m o n key.
• Implicit Key Authentication provides an assurance to principals that no one except specific other parties could have gained access to the c o m m o n key. Implicit
key authentication can be also viewed as key confidentiality.
• B y explicit key authentication it is meant that both implicit key authentication
and key confirmation hold.

3.3 The Design of Multi-Party Key Establishmen
Protocol
This section discusses how to design a multi-party key establishment protocol with
public key schemes. W h e n designing a multi-party key establishment protocol, there
are several phases to be considered. T h efirstis the assumption. W h a t is the structure
of the principals in the multi-party group? T h e second is the security consideration in
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preventing both passive and active intruder knowing the multi-party communication
key. T h e third is the efficiency consideration of the protocol.

3.3.1 Assumption
In the assumption phase, the model of the multi-party key establishment protocol has
to be declared. It includes:
1. What kind of communication system does it have? For example, what kind of
network are the principals connected with?
2. What is the trust assumption? How is the authentication of principals achieved?
For example, is the trusted third party used or not? W h a t is the level of trust
on the trusted third party?
3. What is the enemy's ability to attack the protocol? For example, is the enemy
passive or active?
4. W h a t if there are some un-trustworthy principals inside the group? For example,
a sub-communication will hide inside the multi-party communication so that only
some principals can talk to each other without being known by others.
5. What type is the protocol? For example, key transport or key agreement?
The differences between multi-party key establishment protocol (MKEP) and twoparty key establishment protocols ( K E P ) can be specified as below:
1. In K E P , communication channel is assumed either secret channel or public channel. However, in M K E P , not only communication channel but also communication structure are considered. There are different kinds of communication structures like the tree system, the star system and the broadcast system. In the tree
system, each principal can communicate only with upper and lower principals.
In the star system, principals communicate only with a central principal. In the
broadcast system, each principal can broadcast message to the others.
2. For the entity authentication, the trusted third party is considered in KEP according to different assumptions. In M K E P , for the efficiency of large number
entity authentication, group authentication is also considered as an alternative.
W e will give the definition of group authentication in chapter 7.
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3. In K E P , entity authentication can offer an implicit key authentication to prevent
both passive adversary and active adversary. Key confirmation, in some instance
is not necessary. In M K E P , specially key agreement type protocol, usually involves heavy information exchange between principals, if the adversary is active,
the key will be different owing to the information exchanged is altered by adversary. So key confirmation will be a very important requirement in M K E P . W e
give an easy way to achieve key confirmation in the protocol proposed in chapter
6 and 7. However, it is not usual to assume that the adversary can prevent the
principal receiving any messages from others because, if they can do so, any K E P
or M K E P will not achieve the goal of setting up a session key for all principals.

4. In MKEP, a special flaw can occur if the protocol is not well designed. This can
happen if there are some un-trustworthy insiders. There might have a hidden
sub-conference between principals. This could happen without the knowledge of
the other honest principals through the process of the protocol. However, for the
M K E P , there can always be some sub-conference running if it is assumed that
there are some un-trustworthy insiders. They can agree to a secret key or secret
communication method in advance and use it together with the conference key.
Then, as a result, the other honest principals will not know about its taking place.
This point raises a problem, that if the objective of M K E P is only to establish
a c o m m o n session key, then it cannot prevent the sub-conference. O n the other
hand, what is the meaning of having a sub-conference in a conference?.

5. In the key transport type protocol, usually there is a chairperson responsible f
choosing the multi-party communication key and sending the key to the other
principals. In the key agreement type protocol, each principal exchanges some
information with the others then all principals construct the multi-party key
by themselves. N o one can predict the result of the multi-party key. In K E P ,
only two principal are considered so the efficiency problem is not important. In
M K E P , the number of principals becomes big, the information exchanged will
cause the heavy communication overhead. T h e efficiency problem become the
major problem. Message broadcast is a efficient way to replace the message
transport through secure channel.
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Security Consideration

While provable security may appear to be the highest possible level of security for
a key agreement protocol, from the practical point of views the approach does have
some limitations. Most significantly, it is difficult to judge whether or not real-life
threats and security goals are adequately reflected in a given model. That is, the
provable security of a protocol is meaningful only if one finds the model, definitions
and underlying assumptions to be appropriate for one's purposes.
Nevertheless, significant progress has been m a d e in recent years and authenticated
key agreement protocols which are both provably secure and efficient have been devised
and are being used in practice.
From the similar way, w e also can apply provable security into M K E P . Although
to specify the models and the goals of the protocols is more difficult than that in twoparty key agreement protocols, w e still try our best to achieve the provable security of
our protocol. In chapter 5, 6, and 7, each protocol designed, we all give the prove that
it achieved the goal of the protocol.

3.3.3 Efficiency Consideration
Public key scheme is used in the multi-party key establishment system. Most current implementations of public-key cryptography use either some variation of the R S A
scheme [67], whose security relies on the difficulty of factoring large composite integers
of a specific form, or a discrete logarithm based scheme, whose security relies on the
difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm of an element in afiniteabelian group.
Since encryption and decryption in such cryptosystems usually involve an exponentiation of some kind, the time and computational cost for an encryption or a decryption
can often be prohibitive for certain applications. Consequently, implementors of such
a cryptosystem must discover methods for improving efficiency. Unfortunately, there
have been m a n y instances in which such an efficiency improvement has provided the
crypt-analyst with just enough information to weaken the security provided by the
cryptosystem. In our consideration of efficiency, h o w to reduce the number of exponentiation for each principal during the protocol is the most important factor.
Another efficiency consideration is the communication overhead. H o w m a n y messages are transported through the secure channel or public channel by each principal?
The cost of the secure channel will be more than that of the public channel. H o w to
use the public channel instead of the secure channel also needs to be considered.

3.4. Multi-Party
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Multi-Party Cryptography

Secret sharing has become an indispensable cryptographic tool whenever the control
over execution of a cryptographic operation is assigned to a group rather than to an
individual. Blakley [9] and Shamir [71] considered a key management system in which
the secret is collectively held by a group of n principals allowing any t of them to
recover the secret (t < n). T h e access structure of the secret sharing determines the
collection of all subsets of principals w h o are authorised to recover the secret. O n e of
the simplest access structure is a (t, n) threshold scheme when any collection of t or
more principals are authorised to recover the secret.
Secret sharing is set u p by an algorithm called the dealer. It has to be run by
a trusted party. For a given secret, it produces shares of the secret and distributes
them to principals via secure channels. T o recover the secret, a currently active subset
of shareholders pools the shares and recovers the secret if it belongs to the access
structure, otherwise it fails with an overwhelming probability. T h e recovery of the
secret is typically implemented as the combiner algorithm. It can be run collectively or
by a trusted party (for example one of the active principals w h o is trusted by others).
After secret recovery, the combiner distributes the secret via secure channels to all
active principals. A good tutorial on secret sharing and the vocabulary used can be
found in [81].
Secret sharing allows to define (via its access structure) groups w h o are authorised
to recover the secret. If a cryptographic operation is activated by a proper secret key,
then to allow a group control over it, it is enough to give shares of the secret using a
secret sharing scheme with a properly defined access structure. It should be no surprise
that secret sharing should be of great help while designing conference key establishment
protocols. S o m e of attractive features of secret sharing are listed below.
1. Access structure gives a convenient way to differentiate principals and their power
within the group. This could reflect an amount of trust assigned to each principal
or perhaps, the place of the principal in the organisation. If all principals are
equally trusted or perhaps w e are dealing with a democratic organisation, then
a threshold scheme is appropriate.
2. Delegation is possible if a principal w h o holds her share passes permanently or
temporarily her share to a delegated person or a group of people.
3. Secret sharing used can reflect formal parameters of a conference indicating how
big a subset of active principals has to be to call the conference. Again if the
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threshold secret sharing is acceptable, then the selection of the threshold enables
to manipulate the size of the group w h o is able to call on the conference.
4. Secret sharing can be immunized against the loss of shares by making it proactive
with a share refreshment protocol [33].
5. Group authentication can replace principal authentication. Group authentication
is a weaker requirement and in general can be less expensive to achieve. This is
the case w h e n principals do not need to know precise composition of the currently
active group but they require to be sure that the group is big enough to conduct
a valid conference.
6. Cheating detection well developed in secret sharing, can be used to detect principals w h o misbehave during the protocol execution.

Clearly, secret sharing has also some characteristics which restrict their applicabil
for key establishment protocols. T w o most serious are:
1. The group which wishes to call conference must be known well ahead of the
conference. T h e group can be composed by a trusted dealer or collectively by all
participants.
2. Shares have to be distributed to principals via secure channels.
Groups involved in the conference are typically known well in advance and their memberships are fixed for some time so thefirstcharacteristics seems not to be a problem.
Moreover, secret sharing developed already methods and techniques to deal with modifications of the group (enrolment and disenrolment [81]). The second feature is unavoidable but can be dealt by conversion of secret sharing into the conditionally secure
setting in which shares are communicated via less expensive broadcast channels.

3.5 Trust Infrastructure
A key establishment protocol can be seen as a cryptographic tool which allows to
extend an initial trust which exists between principals A, B and their T T P to a trust
between the two principals. Needless to say that the existence of trust is the necessary
condition for any key establishment protocol to work correctly and to achieve intended
security goals. For instance, N e e d h a m and Schroeder [59] used a T T P w h o generated
a fresh session key and transported it to principals via secure channels. In their key
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agreement protocol, Diffie, van Oorschot and Wiener [27] assumed that any principal
had the access to the other party authenticated public keys. T h e authenticated public
keys were displayed by a T T P in the form of certificates signed by the T T P . Anyone
w h o k n e w the corresponding (authentic) public key of T T P , could verify certificates.
There are three elements of trust infrastructure in secret sharing: the dealer, the
combiner and secure channels. N o w w e discuss these components.

3.5.1 Dealer
The role of dealer can be considered in the context of key transport and key agreement.
In key transport, the dealer algorithm can be run by a T T P or a conference chair w h o
composes principals into a group w h o is eligible to call a conference. Next the chair
determines a proper access structure which reflects position of each principal in the
group and clearly identifies smallest subgroups which are still eligible to call on the
conference. Finally, the chair generates a fresh secret and divides it into shares which
are secretly communicated to principals.
In key agreement, a T T P is a passive entity whose role is restricted to the delivery
of authentic parameters of the principals (their public keys) on demand. The dealer
must therefore be run collectively by principals or in other words, every principal plays
the role of dealer. Each principal sets up her o w n secret sharing for the group of her
choice. Note that each principal has a full control over the access structure of her
secret sharing. T h e shares are next distributed secretly to the other principals. After
all principals have distributed their shares, each principal possesses her o w n share plus
shares obtained from others. Finally, each principal combines all shares into one hoping
that the resulting secret sharing has an access structure acceptable for all.
It is not difficult to notice that this approach can only work if all principals use
the same type of secret sharing which allows to merge m a n y instances of secret sharing
generated locally into one (without a central dealer). A broad class of secret sharing
which allows to do this are linear schemes. Even dealing with linear secret sharing
does not solve a problem of different access structures selected by individual principals.
W e however k n o w that if each principal selects a (t, n) Shamir threshold scheme and
distributes shares to the same collection of principals, then the resulting scheme is also
a threshold scheme. It is easy to check that if each principal selects different threshold
but the collection of principal is the same for all, then the threshold of the composed
sharing is the largest used by principals (with an overwhelming probability).

3.5. Trust Infrastructure

3.5.2

40

Combiner

The role of combiner in secret sharing is to collect shares from principals and if the
currently active subset belongs to the access structure, then the combiner can recover
the secret and communicate it to the principals via secure channels.
In key establishment protocols, the role of the combiner needs to be redefined. Note
that if w e assume that the combiner is trusted, then principals do not need to send their
shares as the combiner can generate a fresh key without interaction with principals.
T h e purpose of secret sharing is to recover the key while in key establishment protocols
any fresh key is good.
For key transport, there is a chair w h o designs a secret sharing of threshold 2 for
a fresh secret. Each principal gets a single share while the chair holds the secret and
one extra share. T h e extra share is used to trigger the conference by broadcasting it
(broadcasting must be authenticated). Each principal, takes her share plus the one
broadcast and recovers the secret key. Observe that each principal plays the role of
combiner.
Assume that there is no chair and the trusted dealer does not participate in conferences but sets up a secret sharing with a fresh key. If the secret sharing has the
threshold n + 1 and the number of all shares is 3n (n is the number of all eligible
principals) and each principal is assigned 3 shares, then to call on a conference, it is
enough if n principals broadcast their shares. Knowing n shares, each principal can
recover the secret key using her second share. T h e third share can be applied to verify
the validity of the secret (or cheating detection). Clearly, a misbehaving principal can
broadcast two or three shares instead of one. If a principal broadcasts two shares, she
can recover the secret but cannot verify it. If she announces three shares, she cannot
participate in the conference.
Consider the role of combiner in the context of key agreement protocols. Assume
that a (n + 1, 2n) secret sharing is set up collectively by all n principals so the threshold
is (n + 1) and each principal holds 2 shares. T o call on a conference, it is enough for
principals to broadcast their single shares. After the announcement of n shares, each
principal can apply the second share to recover the secret (the threshold is (n + 1)).
Situation becomes more interesting if the call for conference can be done by any t
out of n principals.
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Communication Channels

Interaction among principals are done via different communication channels.
*

• Confidentiality channels are very expensive to set up and use. Messages are
encrypted before transmission so any outsider w h o gains access to the channel is
unable to understand them. Confidentiality channels can be implemented using
symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. In the case of symmetric cryptography,
both the sender and the receiver know the same cryptographic key. In asymmetric
(or public key) cryptography, the sender key is public but the receiver's key is
secret. Note that the sender must m a k e sure that the key is the authentic public
key of the intended receiver.
• Authenticity channels are typically less expensive as messages are communicated
in plain and a relatively short authentication string is attached to them. Typically, the receiver can detect whether or not a message comes from the correct
source and has not been tampered with during transmission. Authentication
strings can be implemented using
— digital signatures - every body can verify whether signatures match the
messages and their alleged sender, or
- M A C s (Message Authentication Code) - only holders of secrets which were
used to produce M A C s can verify the validity of pairs: messages and their
MACs.
• Broadcast channels are relatively cheap to implement. T h e sender m a y set up
her publicly accessible billboard (a web page) on which she announces messages
allowing the interested parties to fetch messages when they need them. Clearly,
messages displayed on the billboard can be authenticated by appending to them
signatures.
A secure channel means that it provides both secrecy and authenticity.
All interactions in key transport protocols are performed via secure channels implemented using either secret-key or public-key cryptosystems. This was the case for
Needham-Schroeder protocols and their successors [59]. Key agreement protocols are
normally supported by public-key cryptosystems and broadcasting seems to be a predominant way of message communication ([55]).
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3.6 Security Goals
Security goals may vary but there is a relatively small collection of goals which is
achievable in most conference key establishment protocols. Additionally, it is desirable
that the protocol can be executed efficiently. T h e main collection of security goals for
key establishment protocols are [55]:
• key freshness - the key has not been generated or used before in any other
conference. Typically, to ensure key freshness it is enough to generate the key
at random from a large population so the probability of reusing some of already
generated keys, is negligible,
• entity authentication - this is a confirmation process which allows one principal
to identify correctly the others involved in the protocol. Typically, it allows a
principal to check whether other principals are active (alive) at the time when the
protocol is being executed. This requirement can be relaxed by defining group
authentication in which every principal is sure that all principals are alive and
present. This allows any principal to identify the group rather than individuals.
Weak group authentication means that all currently active principals are sure
that there is a big enough group of active principals. In most circumstances, a
conference is considered to be valid if a quorum of principals is present. T h e
access structure (or the threshold parameter) conveniently determines the size of
a big enough group.
• key confirmation - this is a property of protocol which allows one principal to
m a k e sure that the other parties possess the same c o m m o n key. This is typically
achieved by using the so called handshaking or challenge-response interaction.
T h e idea is to generate a random challenge encrypt it using the key which needs
to be confirmed and expecting from the other party the correct response which
is an agreed before public transformation (say squaring modulo some prime),
• implicit key authentication - it provides an assurance to principals that no one
except specific other parties could have gained access to the c o m m o n key. Implicit
key authentication can be also viewed as key confidentiality,
• explicit key authentication - it means that both implicit key authentication and
key confirmation hold.
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In key agreement protocols, one would expect that the control over thefinalform of the
key is distributed over the principals and there is no way that a subgroup of conspiring
principals can force others to accept the key of their choice. This goal can be termed
as group key control.

Chapter 4
A n Overview of Some Existing
Multi-Party Key Establishment Protocols
This chapter presents an overview of some existing multi-party key establishment protocols. T h e goals are presented in two fold:firstly,a classification of protocols is given.
Secondly, the general description of each protocol is described. Finally, w e give an
analysis of Just and Vaudenay[35] protocol.

4.1 Classification of Multi-Party Key Establishm
Protocol
Basically, there are two ways of classifying multi-party key establishment protocols:
1. As the two-party key establishment protocols, the multi-party key establishment
protocols can be classified into two categories which are the key transport and key
agreement types. T h e key transport (also called the key distribution) protocol is
that the dealer chooses a multi-party key and sends it to principals for a secure
multi-party communication.
T h e key agreement protocol is that principals choose individual information and
exchange it with each other, then combine all the information as a multi-party
1

key.

2. According to different encryption systems used for authentication purpose, the
protocols can be classified into the public key and the private key cryptosystem
types. T h e public key type uses the public key cryptosystem as a base. Each
principal has his/her o w n public and private key pair. T h e public key can be
verified through a Trusted Authority (TA) or by a self-certified public key scheme.
In the private key type, each principal has a secure channel with the dealer.
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T h e dealer give each principal a private key for communication with him/her in
advance.

4.2 Overview of the Protocols
In this section, protocols are discussed as follow:
• Assumptions.
Including the type of the protocol, the structure of principals in the protocol and
communication channel for the protocol.
• Description of the protocol.
A short description of the protocol is presented.
• Security goals achieved.
W h a t kind of security goals were achieved in the protocol.

4.2.1 Ingemarsson, Tang and Wong Protocol
Thefirstmulti-party key establishment protocol was proposed by Ingemarsson et al
[34] in 1982.
• Assumptions.
This protocol is a key agreement type protocol. T h e structure of principals is a
ring so that principal i always sends messages to principal i + 1 and principal
m — 1 sends to principal 0. T h e protocol based on the one way function (f(x) =
axmod

p) and assuming that it is hard to derive x from axmod p.

• Description of the protocol.
There are m principals in a conference, each principal Pi chooses a random integer
Ri and keeps it secretly. From their observation, a symmetry function was used
to ensure the resulting conference key was independent of any permutation of the
individual information of each principal.
The symmetric functions S^(I) are defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 S^{I) is the sum of all possible products of j variables Ry with
distinct indices belonging to the set I. The largest set I, denoted by fl, is

£2 = (0,l,2,---,m-l).
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The conference key for order j is
KU) =

asU)Wmod p.

Principal Pi sends messages to principal Pi+X and principal Pm-X sends messages
to principal PQ. For example, m = 4 . Transmitted messages from principal P2 at
time instant 1, 2, 3, respectively are
aR2mod p
aRl+R2,aRlR2modp
aRo+Ri+R.2

aR0Ri+RoR2+RiR2Tn0Ci

p

Principal P3 raises the first part of the last message to the power i?3 modulo p
and obtains the conference key
j^(2) __ r Ro+Ri+R.2\R3aRoR\+RoR*

+ RiR2 _

aRoR3+RiR3+R2R3+RoRi+RoR2+RiR2mo(i

p

• Security goals achieved.
The security of the protocol is based on the assumption that the function, f(x) =
axmod

p, is one-way and that it is not possible to derive x from axmod p. It

was also assumed that there is no way to derive the second-order exponentials
a s(2) from any set offirst-orderexpressions a5(1). They proved that, even if a
wire-tapper is tapping all the links in the network, he still cannot derive the
conference key.
This protocol achieved key freshness, because each principal chose the random TU
for constructing the key. It also has the principal authentication by using R S A
cryptosystem. It did not give the key confirmation, so it only had implicit key
authentication.

4.2.2 Koyama Protocol
In [40], K o y a m a proposed an identity-based conference key establishment protocol.
• Assumptions.
This protocol is a key agreement type protocol. A key distribution centre prepares the public and private key pair for each principal. The public key is the
identification information of principals and the private key is computed by the
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centre. So this public key cryptosystem is called identity-based public key cryptosystem. Centre needs a secure channel to send the private key to each principal.
The structure of principals is a ring, so that principal i always sends messages to
principal i + 1 and principal m sends messages to principal 1.
• Description of the protocol.
This paper followed the setting of [64] and had two phases. Thefirstphase was
setting up the identity-based public cryptosystem. The key distribution centre
generated R S A parameters and combined with the identity of each principal to
calculate the private key. The centre sends the private key through the secure
channel to the principals. In phase two, principals are connected as a ring. Each
principal sends the messages ( see in the description of the protocol) to his next
principal only. The security of message was based on discrete logarithms and
authentication was based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
During thefirstphase, the key distribution centre generates two primes p, q in the
same way as the R S A cryptosystem, and determines integers (n, e, d) satisfying
n = pq, ed = l(mod L)
L = LCM((p-l),(q-l)),

3<e,d<L,

where L C M denotes the least c o m m o n multiple and e is co-prime to L. It also
determines a prime c (3 < c < L), and an integer g which is a primitive element
in both GF(p) and GF(q). Let M be the largest number of expected conference
members. For principals Pi, whose identification information is IDi, the centre
calculates integers Si as follow:
Si = IDd

mod n.

Note that ID{ = sf~l mod n. Finally, the centre gives the set of integers

(n, g, e, c, S{) to principal Pt. Hence p, q and d are kept secret from any principals
s{ is known only to principal Pi: and n,g,e,c are public and c o m m o n to all the
principals.
During the second phase, the conference key is generated and simultaneously
distributed among m(<

M)

principals, who are connected in a ring so that

principals Pi always sends messages to principals Pi+X and principals Pm sends
to principal Px. The key generation algorithm is the same for each principal.
Therefore, it is sufficient to describe the procedure for one principal, labeled by
i, as follows:
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1. Step 1: principal P{ generates a random number n and sends (Xi,YhZi)
satisfying

Yi — SigCTi mod n
Zi = geTi mod n
to principal Pi+X.
2. Step j(2 < j < m):

principal P{ receives (Xi-i,Yi-i, Zi-i) and computes

Ti-i by
Ti-i = X\_xZi-.x mod n.
Using (Yi-i,Ti-X, e, n), principal Pi checks whether the following congruence
holds:

(^fJ~J =]\\lD^k(modn).
i

i-l

fc=l

If principal Pj obtains the product of IDs of principals Pl-X, Pi-2, • • •, Pi-j+x, then
principal Pi can verify that the message came via these principals successively. *
While j < m — 1, principal Pj sends (Xi, Yi, Zi) satisfying
Xi = Ti-i
Yx = Y^sf1 ZZ2X mod n
Zi = Z\T\ mod n
to principal Pi+X, and then proceeds to the next step j + 1.
Otherwise (i.e. when j = m), principal Pi computes conference key K :
K = ZILX mod n.
The value of K is the same for all principals, because
K =

rm
em ir
g ~ ^-

mod n.

• Security goals achieved.
The security of protocol relies on the difficulty of deriving secret keys such as
p, q, d, sh ^ and K from public keys, transmitted messages and other secret keys
s

i,rj(i ¥" J)- T h i s security is based on the difficulty of computing discrete loga-

rithms and factors of large number. All messages are authenticated by verifying
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the relation between X{, Y{ and Z{. The total number of message transmissions
between principals is m(m

- 1). T h e message length per transmission in this

protocol is 1.5 times greater than the protocol in [64]. Expansion of the message
transmission is need to ensure the security of a conference key.
This protocol achieved the key freshness because each principal chose his own r{.
Principal and message authentication relied on the identity-based cryptosystem.
If any elements of message (X{, Y{, Zi) were changed intentionally, either by an
opponent during transmission or by a principal during processing, the fraud could
be detected by checking IDs. Key authentication in the protocol is implicit.

4.2.3 Laih and Lee Protocol
In [45], Laih and Lee proposed a new threshold scheme and applied it to the conference
key distribution cryptosystem.
• Assumptions.
T h e protocol is based on a preexisting condition in the network that any pair of
principals can share a c o m m o n secret key for communication. The chair-principal
distributes the key shared between him/herself and each principal secretly. The
chair-principal chooses a random matrix A so that the key can be transform to a.
set of vectors. T h e principals can use the vectors and his/her c o m m o n key which
shared with chair-principal to compute the conference key. This protocol is key
transport type protocol. T h e chair-principal chooses the conference key.
• Description of the protocol.
1. The conference chair-principal has to decide that there are m + 1 principals
(including him/herself) in the conference. Then the chair-principal Sm+X
needs to calculate the c o m m o n secret keys K'm+lji, i = 1,2, • • •, m between
each principal and him/herself. Under the public key distribution system,
these keys are
K'm+i,i = EXm+lXimod P = (ym+x)Xtmod P = (yi)Xm+lmod P
where E is the primitive element in GF(P), P is a large number with r bits.
Yi is the public key of principal i. and x, is the secret key of principal i.
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2. T h e chair-principal Sm+X transforms these c o m m o n keys K'm+lii to the modified c o m m o n keys Km+U

by using a one way function F(.) (e.g.. R S A )

with appending some time-dependent information bits. That is, Km+U
F K

( 'm+i,v T)-

T h e modified c o m m o n key Km+U

=

is used for preventing prin-

cipal Uj to derive the c o m m o n key K'm+lji between principal i and the chairprincipal where j ^ i.
3. T h e chair-principal 5 m + 1 divides the r-bit binary string Km+X4
sub-strings as Km+U
bits

(if (^+Tj)is n o t

= (k{, k2, • • •, k m + x ) .
an

into m + 1

Each sub-string kt has ^ y

integer, then w e can add some extra zeros in the

front of thefirststring kx) and represents it in the decimal number form. For
example, if Km+X<i = (01101011)2, r = 8, m = 3, then Km+hi = (kx,k2, k3) =
((001), (101), (011))2 = (1,5, 3) 10 4. T h e c o m m o n secret conference key K is computed as
(Cl, C2, • • • , Cm+i) = Km+ltl X Km+lt2 X • • • X Km+ltr

and
m+1

K = J] absia)
i-2

The chair-principal needs to make thefirstelement, cx, public. This element
cannot be zero, abs(x) means the absolute value of x.

5. T h e chair-principal generates and broadcast the (mi) vectors V~i,i = 1,2, • • •, m1, obtained as follows:
Vx

axx

v2

a-21

Vra-X

a°m.~
•1,1

Km+XtX

a12
a22
a

m-l,2

&2m

' ' '

a

m-l,m

Km+1,2

K.
mJr\,m

where A is a randomly generated (m — 1) x m matrix and the rank needs
to be m — 1 and at least two elements of each row in matrix A need to be
nonzero.
6. Each principal Si can .calculate the conference key K in the following way:
- Evaluate the c o m m o n secret key K'm+X^ between the chair-principal and
him/herself as K'm+li = (ym+x)Ximod
of chair-principal,

P, where ym+x is the public key
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- With knowledge of cx and the received broadcasted vectors Vi, V2, • • •, Vr,
the conference key can be uniquely determined as
(di, d2, • • ,dm)==VxxV2x--x Kn_i x Km+U
and
m+1

.

* = n «*»(?;)
d L

where h! = -

i=2

n

• Security goals achieved.
The key freshness depends on the chair-principal because he/she chooses the
conference key. This protocol does not provide the key confirmation and the key
authentication depends on the unique solution of the matrix operation. Principal
Uj m a y derive the c o m m o n secret key Km+X^ between Ui and chair-principal.
However, since Km+Xyi = F(K'm+xi,T)

and F(-) is a one way function, Uj still

cannot derive K'm+li.
Laih and Lee also gave a general design of converting the threshold scheme to a
conference key distribution protocol. T h e dealer of a threshold scheme can design a
(t,n) threshold scheme in which the c o m m o n conference key K is divided into n =
2(t - 1) shares. The dealer broadcasts the t - 1 shares to all principals, each of w h o m
can then derive the c o m m o n conference key. However, the intruder cannot get any
information from the t - 1 shares. In [5], Berkovits also suggested similar schemes
(both polynomial and vector secret sharing schemes) to broadcast a secret.

4.2.4 Chiou and Chen Protocol
In [20], Chiou and Chen proposed a broadcast system in which the dealer broadcast
only one message and which let the receivers easily derive the c o m m o n conference key.
The method they used improved the efficiency of a trivial solution in which the dealer
concatenates the encryption for each principal together and sends it as a single message.
• Assumptions.
In this protocol, the dealer broadcasts the conference key to all principals so it is
a key transport type protocol. Assume each principal P{ in the broadcast system
has been assigned an integer Nt. Let Nx, N2, • • •, Nn be pair-wise relatively prime,
and public in the broadcast system. Let Ps be the sender. Let ek% be Pi's public
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encrytion key and dk{, be Pj's secret decryption key. d and e are the private and
public session key pair. The format of the sent-out message is given as follows:

X CKD C,
where X is the lock being the solution of the following congruous equations:
X = Eeki (d) mod N{
for all Pj in V (group of users).
C K D is the ciphertext of d which is encrypted by e; i.e.. CKD

= 2£g(d), and

which is used by the receivers to check whether the sender wants to communicate
with them or not. C is the ciphertext of the message M which is encrypted by

e; i.e.. C = E&{M).
• Description of the protocol.
T h e Encryption Algorithm:
Input: The secret message M, the public relatively prime integers Ni,N2,---,Nn,
and the public encryption keys of the users in V.
Output: The message to be broadcasted; that is, X, CKD

and C.

1. For a secret message M, the sender arbitrarily selects an encryption sessio
key e for encryption M; i.e., C = Eg(M), and a deciphering session key d
for decrypting the ciphertext C; i.e., M =

Dd(C).

2. Use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute the common solution from
the following congruous equations:
X = Rxmod Nx
X = Ri mod N{,
for all Ui in G, and

X = Rm mod Nm,
where Ri is the ciphertext of d, which is enciphered by eki\ i.e., Ri — Eeki(d).
3. Compute the C K D and encipher M with e; i.e., CKD
E,(M).
4. Broadcast the message; i.e., send X,CKD

and C out.

= Eg(d), and C =
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T h e Decryption Algorithm:
Input: The sent-out message, and the deciphering key dk{ of the receiver P*.
Output: The secret message M.

1. Compute d from X by using the receiver's deciphering key, dk{. Then co
pare d to the CKD;

i.e., to compute d = Ddki(Xmod NA = Ddki(Ri), and

check whether Dd(CKD)

is equal to d or not. If not, the receiver knows

that this message was not sent to him/her and stops.
2. Decipher the ciphertext C with d; i.e., compute

M = Dd(C).

3. End.

While using the public-key cryptosystems, one who sends a message to a r
Pi shall encrypt the message under Pj's public encryption key. Then the receiver
can decrypt the ciphertext under his/her secret decryption key. From the above
decryption algorithm, in order to compute d, the principal Pi in G only needs to
decrypt Ri with his/her own deciphering key dk{. Hence, for each principal in the
system, only one key needs to be kept secret. This approach uses a public-key
cryptosystem and only needs 0(n) secret keys instead of 0(2n).
• Security goals achieved.
The key freshness depends on the dealer because he/she choose the conference
key. The principal authentication depends on the public key cryptosystem in
which the public key is known by dealer. There is no key confirmation and the
key authentication is implicit. The principals can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain
the conference key only because the dealer used their public key to encrypt the
conference key .

4.2.5 Lin, Chang and Lee Protocol
In [48], Lin, Chang and Lee proposed a broadcast system which is similar to the scheme
of[20] but which uses a mathematical method called Q-lock as an encryption method.
• Assumptions
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This protocol is a key transport type protocol. Principals are belong in a broadcast channel which is characterized that a single transmission from a source principal m a y be received simultaneously by many destination principals. This protocol is based on a public key cryptosystem so that each principal have a private
and public key pair in advance. The Q-lock combines the individual encrypted
messages as one single message then broadcasts it to all principals. The length
of the single message is the same as adding the length of all encrypted messages
together.
• Description of the protocol.
Let each principal Ui have a private key Xi and a public key Y{. Now, a nonempty
group G' of principals, with a principal Uc as the chairperson, will hold a conference securely. First, the principal Uc selects a secret conference key Kx which
will be encrypt and decrypt messages among principals in G'. Let the functions
E and D be defined as follows:
Ri = E(KX, Yi) = Kx{Yi)K'mod p
and
Kx = D(Ky, Xt, Ri) = Ri((Ky)XiYlmod

p

where (-)-1 indicate the multiplicative inverse of (•) over GF(p). Then the principal Uc computes a vector R = (Rx, R2, • • •, Rn) and computes a number Q and
use it as a sealed lock. Q = E?=i MP + l) i _ 1 - L o c k Q isthen P u t o n the P ublic
directory such that every user can read it. Accordingly, the key Kx is hidden in
the sealed lock Q and Q can only be opened by legitimate users. The detailed
steps for the user Uc is below.
Input: A set of n public keys Yx, Y2, • • •, and Yn.
Output: The sealed lock Q.
1. Select a conference key for the users in G'
Again: Select a Kx from numbers in GF(p). Compute Ky - (Z)K*mod p.
While Ky = Yf for some i e {1, 2, • • •, n} Goto Again Use Kx as the conference key.
2. Compute a vector R
If U{ e G' Then Compute Ri = Kx(Yi)K*mod
(Rx,R2, • • • ,Rn).

p Else Rt = 0. Let R =
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3. Construct a sealed lock Q
Compute a number Q.
4. Output the lock Q
Put Q on the public directory.
For any principal U{ in G', he/she can reveal the conference key Kx from Q by
using his own private key Xi. The revealing procedure is described as follows.
Input: The lock Q and the private key X{ for U{.
Output: T h e conference key Kx.
1. Get the lock Q
Read the lock Q from the public directory.
2. Find the i-th component of R
Compute R, = [Q/(p + l) i_1 Jmod (p + 1).
3. Obtain the conference key from Ri
Compute Kx = Ri((Ky)Xi)~lmod p.
• Security goals achieved.
Key freshness depends on the principal Uc who chooses the conference key. Principal authentication depends on the based public key cryptosystem. There is no
key confirmation step but implicitly principal can be sure that he/she has the
conference key through the design of Q lock.
Comment:
The following properties of this broadcast system are stated in [20].
1. Only a single copy of a message from a sender has to be encrypted and transmitted.
2. For a group of users, only one c o m m o n secret key is required.
3. The key can be changed without changing the user's keys.
The first point is misleading if not incorrect. It is two ciphertexts that are transmitted; the lock Q and public value of session key Ky. The computation of Ky is a single
encryption used to allow the recovery of K by members in P. However, there are also
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t other encryptions performed by the sender, i.e., computation of the Vj's. The second
point merely states the ability of the system to provide users in P with a c o m m o n key.
The third point is based on tile assumption that tire underlying cryptosystem is secure.
Even if the session key is compromised, the secret keys of each of the users need not
to be changed.

4.2.6 Klein, Otten and Beth Protocol
In [37], Klein, Otten and Beth gave a better analysis of the trust of the principals
under different assumptions of the conference key establishment protocols. They also
described the properties of a good conference key.
• Assumptions
This protocol is a key agreement type protocol. It is assumed that each principal
is able to compute random numbers and to verify the identities of the other
principals. There also exists a directory which can be written and read by all
principals. Principals can exchange their messages through the directory. To
ensure authenticity of written messages, a suitable digital signature scheme with
public key and private pairs for principals is used.
• Description of the protocol.
N o w w e briefly describe the protocol for Principal Pi. The protocol includes a
recovery procedure to identify cheating participants deviating from the protocol
specification. T h e one-way function D and a source x are chosen in advance and
published.
1. Participant Pj chooses ai at random as his/her protocol input, keeps it
as secret, and writes the triple(i, [i], {pid, D(ai,x)}K-)

into the c o m m o n

directory, (pid is the identity information of principal)
2. T h e following steps (a) to (d) are repeated for 1 < k < n - 2:
- (a) Pt collects all messages (j, A, {pid, DA(x)}K-

) with i $ A and |A| =

k from the directory.
- (b) For each triple Pj computes D(ai,DA(x))
(i, [A, i], {pid, D(ai, DA(x))}K-

and writes

) into the directory.

"i

- (c) After all Principals have finished their computations in round k,
every P{ looks at all triples with identical index list A(\A\ = k + l) and
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If a difference is detected the Principals

belonging to the index list A are told to run the recovery procedure.
If the whole protocol is not aborted in the recovery procedure, the last
step (d) follows.
- (d) At a last step identical copies for any list A with \A\ = k + 1 are
deleted. If k > 1 then any triple with index list A and \A\ = k is
removed from the directory.
3. Finally Pj gets the triple (j, A, {pid, DA(x)}K-

) with |A| = n - 1 and i £ A

from the directory and computes the session key K := D(ai,Da(x)).
• Security goals achieved.
T h e key freshness is achieved. Each principal can fully influence the distributed
conference key K

by choosing his/her individual input a*. T h e implicit key

authentication can be achieved by comparing the value of Da(x) in the 3-(c) step
of the protocol. From the trust-based point of view, this protocol did not require
trust in the other principals, but inefficiency was the main problem. From the
security-based point of view, the protocol has the same security property as the
approach of [34] w h o proposed a protocol with 0(n2) steps where cheating of
principals cannot be detected.

4.2.7 Burmester and Desmedt Protocol
In [11, 12], Burmester and Desmedt investigated different environment assumptions
and proposed a very efficient conference key establishment protocol.
• Assumptions.

T h e protocol is key agreement type protocol. T h e protocol is based on DiffieHellman key exchange protocol and a ring structure of principals. Each principal
can communicate only with upper and lower principals. There are some important assumptions underlying this protocol. Specifically, it requires each P{ to
broadcast the messages to the other principal and to receive t - 1 messages in a
single round. T h e system has to handle t simultaneous broadcasts (in one round).
Description of the protocol.
They constructed a very efficient protocol [11] which executes in only three
rounds:
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1. Each principal Pj generates its random exponent Xi and broadcasts Z{ = aXi.
2. Each Pj computes and broadcasts Wi = (zi+l/Zi-.X)X
3. Each Pi can now compute the key S = zfjx • Wf~l • Wf+X2 • • • Wi_2mod
The resulting key is S =

XlX2+X2X3+ +xtX1
a

-

p

.

• Security goals achieved.
This protocol did not solve the principal authentication problem. It is proven
secure if the D H problem is intractable in the confidential aspect but it still
suffers from the man-in-the-middle attack. Key authentication is not applied in
this protocol yet.

4.2.8 Just-Vaudenay Protocol
In [35], Just and Vaudenay proposed a conference key agreement protocol based on an
authenticated two-party key agreement protocol to solve the authentication problem

in [11].
• Assumptions
This protocol is a key agreement type protocol. It is assumed that the group
of principals V = {Px,..., P n } is already arranged into a cycle and each pair of
principals has run a two-party key agreement protocol.
• Description of the protocol.
In the paper the two party key agreement protocol is a version of the S T S protocol. For the sake of clarity we assume that this protocol provides the standard
collection of goals: key freshness, key confidentiality, explicit key authentication
and mutual entity authentication. As the result of the execution of the protocol
for pairs (Px, P2), ..., (P„-i, P„),(P„, Pi), the pair (Pj, Pl+X) holds the session key
Ki. Note that the indices are computed modulo n where zero index is n.
J V Multi-party K e y A g r e e m e n t Protocol [35]
1. Each pair of principals (Pj, Pl+X) holds a session key K{.
2. Each Pi computes and broadcasts W{ = jfc.
3. After receiving the values Wj, P% computes the group key
K = K\_xWll W\'l • • • Wi-i = KXK2 •••Kn
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• Security goals achieved.
Because the authenticated two-party key agreement protocol is the base, the
principal authentication can be achieved. To construct a conference the messages
broadcast through the public channel by each principal, the key authentication
does not achieve. There also does not have key confirmation in the protocol.

4.2.9 Saeednia and Safavi-Naini Protocol
In [68], Saeednia and Safavi-Naini gave some improvement for [11, 35] to achieve the
highest class protocol of their classification.
• Assumptions
This protocol is key agreement type protocol. In this protocol, they assumed
that a trust authority distributes the public and private key pair to individual
principal. T h e principals are connected as a ring.
• Description of the protocol.

The trust authority prepares the user's public key, ID and computes the user's
private key as the pair (x, y) where x = aID~ (mod n), y = j3~ID

(mod n).

There are three steps:
1. Each U{,i = l,---,m, selects U eR Zu, computes z{ = au(mod

n) and

broadcast it.
2. Each Uhi = l,---,m, computes c = F(zx\\Z2\\-• • \\zm) (where "||" denotes
the concatenation), and then computes and broadcast v{ = (^)u(mod
and w{ = yf • x{Mu(mod

n)

n).

3. Each U{,i = 1, • • •, m , checks whether w\Dj • (3C = zfj{vj)(mod n);
j = 1,..., i - 1, i + 1, • • •, m . If so, computes the conference as
Ki = zT-{ • vt~l) • • • "Li • Vi-2(mod n).
Security goals achieved.
This protocol provides key confirmation during the protocol without using an
extra protocol. A n additional message is used as the authentication of both messages and principals. The pair (zi,Wi) constitutes, at the same time, a signature
of v{ and a witness of the knowledge of U, as well as Uis secret key.
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Comment:
In this protocol, a trust authority is used to distributes the public and private key
pair to individual principal. This becomes a weakness of the protocol. T h e outsider
needs only attack the trust authority to get the public and private key pairs of all
principals then he/she has enough information to compute the conference key. It is
better to use the self-certified public key cryptosystem instead of the identity-based
public cryptosystem.
T h e Classification of Protocol:
T h e highest class protocol must satisfy the following properties.
A All insiders must be able to compute the conference key Kc.
B Kc must be fresh.
C No outsider, having access to polynomially many messages of the previous runs
of the protocols and the corresponding keys, can calculate Kc. A protocol might
achieve property C under two kinds of adversaries, resulting in two classes of
security.
Cl A passive outsider cannot find Kc.
C 2 A n active outsider cannot share a key with any insider in such a way that
they cannot detect its presence.
D Every insider can be sure that either he/she is sharing the same key with all the
conference principals or that no two principals share a c o m m o n key. Property
D results in two different classes of security with respect to active outsiders or
malicious insiders.
D l It is infeasible for an active outsider to break the authenticity of the conference key without an insider detecting the fraud.
D 2 It is infeasible for any coalition of malicious insiders to break the authenticity
of the conference key without no insider detecting the fraud.

4.2.10 Steiner and Tsudik, and Waidner Protocol
Recently, several key agreement protocols geared for dynamic peer groups (DPGs) have
been proposed in [79]. Such groups are c o m m o n in m a n y layers of the network protocol
stack and m a n y application areas of modern computing. Examples of D P G s include
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replicated servers (such as database, web and time), audio and video conferencing and,
more generally, collaborative applications of all kinds. In contrast to large multicast
groups, D P G s tend to be relatively small in size, on the order of a hundred members.
(Larger groups are harder to control on a peer basis and are typically organised in a
hierarchical manner.) D P G s typically assume a many-to-many communication pattern
rather than the one-to-many pattern commonly found in larger, hierarchical groups.
They were obtained by extending the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange method
[26] to groups of n parties. These protocols perform what is referred to initial key
agreement (IKA) within a group. Once a group is formed and the initial key is agreed
upon, group members m a y leave (or be excluded) and new members m a y join. Moreover, entire groups m a y join and entire sub-groups m a y need to be excluded. A n y
membership change must cause a corresponding group key change in order to preserve
key independence. Since re-running full I K A for each membership change is expensive,
other supporting protocols are necessary. T h e operations supported by these protocols
are collectively called auxiliary key agreement ( A K A ) . A K A protocols, also based on
Diffie-Hellman extensions, have been developed in [80]. Both I K A and A K A protocols
have shown themselves secure against passive adversaries. (This security is based on
the polynomial indistinguishability of a Diffie-Hellman key from an arbitrary random
value.)
Steiner et al. [80] introduced a class of protocols, called generic Group DiffieHellman ( G D H ) key agreement. This entire class has proven resistant against passive
attacks. In brief, [80] shows that if a 2-party D H key is indistinguishable from a random
value then a t-party D H key is also indistinguishable from a random value.
In [2], G.Ateniese, M . Steiner and G. Tsudik use the results of [79, 80] to develop
practical and secure authenticated key agreement protocols for D P G s . They also considered other relevant security features such as key confirmation, key integrity and
entity authentication.
• Assumptions
This protocol is key agreement type protocol. Each principal Pj is require to have
two shared keys (one in each direction) with every other Pj.
• Description of the protocol.
R o u n d i(Q < i < n):
1. Pi receives a set of n intermediate values: {Vk\l < k < n}. (Px which can
be thought of as receiving an empty set in thefirstround):
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, a(-Lrir-)-(^i.-.^(i-i))

Xfk<(i-i),

*k — \
a (ri,-,r i _ 1 )-(lf fcl ,-,iffc (i _ 1) )

iffc

< (i _ 1)

2. Pj updates each Vfc as follows:
,n.-.ri-i

(Vk)K"-ri = a{ ' -*,~ H^u,-,^-!)) ifjfc < i,
^

=

<

(Vfc)^**" r i = Q;(ri''"'r'-l)-(^fcl.-.'fi'fc(i-l))

ifjt > j

Vfc

if A; = i

In the initial round Pi sets Vi = a 1 .
Round n:
1. Mn broadcasts a set of all Vk values to the group.
2. O n receipt, each Pi selects the appropriate Vi where:
Vi = ^ ^ ^ H A ' u , - , ^ )

Pj proceeds to compute:
fy^^u'-^n,^

_ an,-,r„

For the above, instead of computing n-1 individual key inverses of the form
K~l, each P{ computes only a single compound inverse P, = (A^~\ ••-,K~i)
ij

where Pj = (KXi, • • •, Kni)
• Security goals achieved.
This protocol achieves the complete key authentication. It means that each
principal Pj knows that the key he/she holds has been contributed to by every
principal. K e y confirmation can be easily added into the protocol by broadcast
one more information form P n . A s the result of additional message, the protocol
also provides principal authentication of P n to all other principals.

4.2.11 Tzeng Protocol
In [86], Tzeng proposed a conference key agreement protocol with fault-tolerant property.
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• Assumptions
This is a key agreement type protocol. Each principal U{ has a private and public
key pair (x{ and y{). The system has a public directory that records the system's
public parameters and each principal's public key that can be accessed by every
one. All principals are connected by an authenticated broadcast network such
that the messages sent on the network can be identified and cannot be altered,
blocked or delayed. Therefore, every one can send and receive the message on
the network without interruption. N o private channel exists between users.
• Description of the protocol.
The system has public parameters:
- p: a large prime number that is 2<? + 1, where q is a large prime also.
— H: a one-way permutation from Zq to Zq.
— g: a generator (primitive element) for the sub-group Hq of quadratic residues

ofz;.
Each user Ui has two parameters:
- Private parameter XJ: a number in Z*.
- Public parameter yi = gXimod p. Since q is prime, yi is a generator for Hq.
The protocol starts with that an initiator calls for a conference for a set U of
principals. Without loss of generality, let U = {Ux, U2, • • •, Un) be the initial
principal set. Each Ui, i = 1,2, • • •, n, knows U.
1. Secret distribution and commitment: each principal U{ does the following:
- Randomly select Ri,Ki e Zq, Si € Z*.
- Compute a polynomial h{(x) (over Zq) of degree n that passes points
(j, yfmod

pmod q), j = 1, 2, • • •, n, and (0, K{).

— Compute and broadcast
Wij = hi(n + j)mod q,j = l,2,---,n,
on = g^mod p,
jt = gSimod p,
Si = S~l(H(Ki) - ^mod

q.
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2. Sub-key computation and verification: each principal Ui does the following
for j ^ i:
- O n receiving wjhl = l,2,---,n, and ay, compute polynomial hfa)
(over Zq); of degree n that passes (n + l,Wjt),l = l,2,---,n, and
(i,aXimod pmod q).
- Lettfj.= h'j(0)mod q.
- Check whether (jj,6j) is the ElGamal signature of H(K'j) by IT,-, i.e.,
check whether gH(K'j)modp = yf^fmodp.

If so, broadcast V}j =" success".

Otherwise, broadcast Vji ="failure".
3. Fault detection: each principal Ui does the following for j ^ i:
- O n receiving Vji = " failure" for some [/,-: £/, claims that £/j itself is
faulty.
* Output Ri,Ki, S — i.
— O n receiving Vjm ="failure": Uj claims that Um, m ^ i, is faulty.
* Wait for Um:s fault detection messages Rm^Km^m.

f

* If Um's fault detection messages are not received, set Um as a malicious principal.
* O n receiving Rm, Km, Sm, check whether wmi, m—

1,2, • • •, n, am, 7 m ,
Rm

and 5m are correct i.e. check whether am = g mod

p, whether •;

there is an n-degree polynomial over Zq passing points
(I, yRmmod

(0,Km),

p mod q), and (n + /, wmi),l = 1, 2, • • •, n, and whether

(7m, dm) is the ElGamal signature of Um on H(Km).

If so, set Uj as

a malicious principal. Otherwise, set Um as a malicious participant.
- Restart the protocol by deleting malicious principals from his principal
set U.
4. Conference-key computation: If no faults are detected in the fault detection
stage, each principal Ui computes the conference key
K = (K'n,K'l2,---,K'Jmodq
where the current principal set is U' — {U^, C/j2, • • •, Uim}.
• Security goals achieved.
This protocol achieves key freshness through that each principal chooses K{ as
part of the information of the conference key. The entity authentication bases

4.3. Simbo and Kawamura

Attack

65

on the assumptions that each principal has a private and public key pair and the
message can be broadcast through an authenticated channel. Key confirmation
and key authentication are achieved by using the ElGamal signature scheme to
sign the value H(K{).

B y checking the signature the malicious principal can be

detected so that the protocol has the the fault tolerant property.

4.3 Simbo and Kawamura Attack
In [73], Simbo and Kawamura developed an attack (SK attack) which can derive the
secret information of an entity through a conspiracy of other entities against the protocols [43, 18] of a key sharing system. The problem of the two schemes is that they
have the following c o m m o n features:
1. One user, being a pivot, distributes a common key to the other members by a
star type communication.
2. The authentication scheme based on the extended Fiat-Sharnir protocol [63, 31,
62] is used. T h e pivot user plays a prover, while other users play verifiers. The
authentication scheme is iterated between the pivot user and each member.
3. The randomized information in the extended Fiat-Shamir scheme is utilized to
send a c o m m o n key secretly. A c o m m o n key is encrypted into a ciphertext that
can be deciphered only by a legitimate verifier, and the ciphertext is used as the
randomized information.
In the schemes, each of the prover's random numbers determines the encrypted
result of a c o m m o n key for each verifier. Since the c o m m o n key is fixed during one
group key distribution session, the prover's "random numbers" are not independent
even though they seem to be so at thefirstsight. The seemingly random numbers can
be transformed into afixedvalue by the conspiracy of plural members in the group w h o
have secret transformation keys. Then, they can derive new knowledge of the pivot
user's secret by eliminating the fixed value term from plural pieces of authentication
information. Finally, the new knowledge results in the derivation of the secret. Note
that the prover's "random numbers" seem to be random and independent of each other
for a m e m b e r w h o does not belong to the group but they are, however, not independent
for the members in the group.
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K o y a m a published new key distribution schemes [41] as a modification of his former scheme[43]. Although n e w version is rendered secure against S K attack by he
introduction of n e w random variables, it still needs interactive communication.
In [19], Chikazawa and Yamagishi proposed an improved identity-based key sharing
system for multi-address communication to counter the S K attack by giving entities
unique random numbers. T h e proposed scheme needs no interactive communication
but the chairman of the conference has to transmit distinct ciphertext to each individual
principal involved in the conference.
In [17], Chen and H w a n g proposed a conference key broadcast system against S K
attack and used the broadcast channel to distribute the conference key. The principals
can verify that the conference key is from the chairman.

4.4 The Lack of Key Freshness in the Just-Vaud
Multi-party Key Agreement
This section discusses key freshness in the Just-Vaudenay multi-party key agreement
protocol. W e show that two cheating principals can jointly force the other honest
principals to accept a group key of cheaters' choice. Moreover, a coalition of cheaters
can remove or replace a-honest principal's key contribution.

4.4.1 Introduction
A generalisation of the D H protocol for conferences was done by Burmester and
Desmedt [11]. T h e authors, however, neglected the entity authentication which exposed their protocol the man-in-the-middle attack. This weakness was identified by
Just and Vaudenay in [35]. They also simplified the Burmester-Desmedt (BD) protocol
and added pairwise entity authentication.
W e show that the Just-Vaudenay multi-party key agreement protocol does not
provide the key freshness and allows cheating principals to remove or replace key contributions of honest principals.

4.4.2 Key Freshness in the JV Protocol
The authors analysed their protocol and proved that their protocol was secure against
passive attacks. Also they considered two active attacks (the shielding and middleperson attacks). T h e key freshness which is present in the two-party key agreement is
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not transitive and cannot be guaranteed in the mutli-party protocol.
Theorem 4.1 The JV multi-party key agreement protocol does not guarantee the key
freshness.
Proof. The proof describes an attack in which two members of the group V, say
(Pi,P2), force the other principals to accept a key kF of their choice to be the final
group key. Clearly, we assume that each pair has completed their two-party key agreement protocol and each pair (Pj,Pj+i) holds the session key Ki. The cheaters (Pi,p2)
wait until other principals have announced their W j . Then knowing W3,..., Wn, both
compute
k = K2, K3,..., Kn.
P2 computes keys in the following order:
(K2,WZ) -> K3
(K3,W4)

->

K4

(tf„_2,W„-i) -• AVi
Pi obtains the same collection of keys differently by

(Kn,Wn) -+ AVi
(AVi,^n-i)

->

Kn_2

(KA,W4) -> K3
The cheaters compute their new session key (different from A"i)
kx = kpk~l
and they broadcast Wx = j± and W2 = ff. Now every principal can calculate their
final group key which is
K = kxK2, K3,...,Kn = kF
The group key is kF as intended by the cheaters.
The lack of key freshness contradicts the main property of key agreement which
requires that principals must equally contribute to thefinalgroup key. The key is not
negotiated and, in fact, can be imposed by a subgroup of principals. Note that this
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weakness exists in neither the DH nor BD protocols. Principals broadcast their p
key material while keeping their exponents secret. The cheating principals can force
the other principals to accept a key of their choice only if they can solve the discrete
logarithm problem.
Some other security implications are:

• the lack of key confidentiality - if the cheating principals force the group to
accept a key which is known to some outsiders. The key can be compromised
BEFORE(!!!) the execution of the protocol,

• the susceptibility to the reply attack - if the cheaters force the group to use
previously used key than all the communication can be replayed and principals
will not be able to distinguish current conference dialog from the replayed one.

It seems that key freshness can be enforced by adding a step in the protocol req
principals to commit themselves to their true values Wi before broadcasting them. This
could be done by sending signed hash values of Wi. Clearly, the attack demonstrated in
the proof will no longer work. Unfortunately, a subgroup of principals can selectively
remove key contributions of some victim principals as the following theorem states.

Theorem 4.2 Given 5 principals Pj_2, Pj-i, Pj, Pj+i, Pj+2 in the JV protocol hold
ing their pair-wise keys Ki-2,Ki_x,Ki,Ki+x,

where n > 5.

Then (Pi+x,Pi+x) and

(Pj_i,Pj_2) can jointly remove the contribution of Pi by modifying their keys Kl+X,
Ki_2 so their keys satisfy the following equation
K'i+XK[_2 = Kl+xKi_2(KiKi_x)-\.
The group key is
_ Kx • • • Kn
KiKi_x
The proof is easy. Interestingly enough the theorem is also true for n = 3 when any
coalition of two principals can set the key to the value of their choice.
Note that both the D H and B D protocols guarantee freshness to every honest
principal who selects their own secret exponent randomly. This property does not hold
in the J V protocol. The protocol allows to manipulate the group key by removing
(or replacing) contributions of honest principals by subgroups of cheaters. The JV
protocol is not a multi-party key agreement and we failed to find any efficient way to
fix it except going to its (less efficient) predecessor - the B D protocol.

Chapter 5
Efficient Key Agreement in Hierarchical
Groups

5.1

Introduction

In the real world, however, conferences are conducted among parties whose position
and role differ and depend on their place in their organisation hierarchy. Normally,
if there is a conference with participants from different organisations, the participants
are delegated by their superiors w h o m a y also wish to be able to enter the discussion at
any time they see it appropriate. In this chapter, w e address the problem of conference
key agreement a m o n g parties w h o belong to two hierarchical groups. It is reasonable
to assume that there is a global trusted authority (TA) which keeps copies of authentic
public keys of hierarchical groups (organisations). T h e corresponding secret keys are
kept in safe place by the organisation chief managers (participants on the top of the
hierarchy). Each organisation (hierarchical group) keeps its White Pages directory
which is also publicly accessible. T h e directory contains authentic information about
the organisation structure and public keys of all members.

5.2 Background

A hierarchical group is an ordered sequence of levels indexed from 0 to n where the lev
L 0 indicates the top level and the level Ln is the lowest in the hierarchy. Typically, the
top level is occupied by a single person called the chief manager or simply the manager
of the group. At each lower level L{, there can be a number of participants whose
position in the hierarchy is the same. For the sake of simplicity, w e assume that on
the level L{ there is a single participant Pj. T h e group G can be seen as the sequence
of participants (P 0 , Pi,..., P„). Po controls the whole group G. A n y participant P,;
i = 1,2,...,n - 1, controls (directly or indirectly) all participants Pj on the lower
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hierarchical levels (j = i + 1,..., n ) [30].
A significant difference between conference key agreement for hierarchical groups
and for democratic groups is that top level participants are focal points for the information flow to and from hierarchical groups. This natural property can be exploited to
make key agreement more efficient. T h e important ingredient of any key establishment
protocol is trust. T o ensure mutual entity authentication, it is necessary to provide
a source of trusted information. Usually, we assume that there is a trusted authority
(TA) w h o is keeping publicly accessible authentic information about participants.
In particular, we assume that
1. there are two hierarchical groups G and G'. Levels of the group correspond to the
ordered sequence of participants (P0, PL,..., Pn). The group G' includes levels
which relate to participants (PQ, P{,..., P m ) ,
2. there is a trusted authority TA who keeps public keys of the groups. When TA
is set up, T A selects a large enough public modulus q (q is prime) and primitive
element g. Both q and g are public. G or more precisely its top participant P 0
selects a random integer r e Z*, computes the group public key gT and registers
it with T A after a mutual identification. The identification is conducted using
traditional means such as passwords,fingerprints,etc. The top level participant
of group 6" acts in similar way and registers his public key gT',

3. each hierarchical group (the top level participant) maintains its local trusted registry (TR) with public keys of lower level participants. So the group G maintains
T R G and the group G' - T R c ,
4. the top level participants (managers) delegate some of their subordinates to take
part in conference. A n y other participant (except the participant on the lowest
level) can also nominate the participant directly below him.
The separation of global trusted authority TA from local trusted authorities TRG and
T R G / seems to lead to more efficient management of trusted information. Global T A
keeps authentic information about the groups and the information is expected to be
updated or modified infrequently, say once per week, month, or year. Another factor
which m a y favour separation is cost. Global services tend to be very expensive due to
the necessity of replication of the server with all the problems related to consistency
and availability [23]. Local T R s are maintained by the group managers (or delegated
persons) and hold all short-lived authentic information about members of the group.
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The update is done frequently, say every hour, day or week. A local T R can be readily
adjusted to changes reflecting the current structure of organisations and distribution
of responsibilities among the staff. The cost of implementation is small as most of the
work would need to be done anyway in a computer-supported environment.

5.3 Conference Key Agreement
The protocol will be initialised by managers of two groups G and G'. The managers
also will distribute information to their groups via public channels (broadcasting) so
when the need for the conference arises, the conference can be set up quickly.
The goals of the protocol are:

1. to establish a fresh shared secret key which is delegated to lower levels by bro
casting a.go-ahead ticket,

2. to provide mutual group authentication (this translates to mutual authenticatio
of managers),
3. to ensure mutual authentication of the manager of a group and the participants
delegated by him,

5.3.1 Initialisation
This part is independently performed by both groups G and G'. W e discuss the initialisation procedure for the group G only. The initialisation procedure for the group G' is
identical. The manager P 0 executes the initialisation procedure through the following
steps:
1. P0 randomly chooses an integer r eR Z* and computes his public key
Y = gr (mod q).

The integer r is the secret key of the group (the manager) while Y is the public ke
of the group (manager) registered and stored with the global trusted authority
TA,
2. P0 selects n + 1 random integers x{ £R Z* (i = 0,..., n) and calculates
n

xQ = J2xi (mod ? )
i=0
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and the sequence of integers (see [30])
n

Xi = Y,Xj (modg),
j=i

3. P0 sends the pair (Xt, x{) to P{ via a secure channel for i = 1,..., n - 1 and a
single integer X n = z n to the participant P n sitting on the lowest level. This can
be written as
P 0 -> Pj : {Xu x{) for i = 1, 2,..., n - 1
Po —>• P n : X n .
The public keys 1^ = p A i m o d q are stored in the local trusted registry T R G for
i = 1,... ,n.
According to our assumption the manager knows all secret elements of other participants of the group. A n y participant Pi for i ^ n also knows the secret key of his
direct subordinate Pi+X as Xi+X = X{ — Xi. Consequently, P 0 can play the role of all
other participants and each Pj (i ^ n) can control communication of his subordinate
Pj+i. A n outsider w h o wants to use the public key Yi to communicate with participant ••
Pj (i ^ 0), then he/she is unable to distinguish w h o m he/she talks with from Pi, the
manager Po and the direct superior Pj_i, as all three know the secret key Xi. This
characteristic is desirable as it makes the interactions between clients and the group
more flexible. To illustrate the point, assume that a client inquires the group directly .
to a nominated participant. If the matter needs to be handled by a higher level, the
participant can easily transfer the inquire to the manager without client noticing it.

5.3.2 Key Agreement between Managers
This is a modification of the standard D H protocol [26] with elements from the S T S
protocol [27]. Communication is done using a public channel. The protocol takes the
following steps executed by two managers P 0 (group G) and P Q (group G').
1. The managers P0 and PQ collect their authentic public keys from TA. Consequently, P 0 knows the public key Y' and P Q knows the public key Y. Further the
managers choose their fresh nonces so P 0 takes a <ER Z* and P Q selects B €R Z*.
The two nonces are kept secret.
2. P0 computes
R = (Y')raX° = grr'aXo mod q
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and PQ determines
R> = Yr'^o = g^'o mod q.
3. The managers exchange messages as follows:
• P0 -> P^ : P,
.

P^P0:R',signP>(H(k,R,R')),

•

PQ^P^.signPo(H(k,R',R))

where signp(x) stands for signature generated by P for message x. The sign
is generated using the secret keys matching the public keys stored in TA. H(x) is
a collision-free hashing algorithm computed for the message x. The description
of H is publicly known. Note that PQ hashes the sequence (k, R, R') while P 0

finds hash value of the sequence (k, R!, R). The common secret key is k. P 0 finds
out the key from
k = (R')aX° = £"-W°*o

(mod q).

On the other hand, PQ works out the key using
k = (R)0X'° = grr'a^x°xo (mod q).
4. Finally, the managers hash the calculated key A; and integers R and R'
rect order and compare the hash values with those recovered from the signatures.
If the check fails for a party, the party aborts the protocol.

5.3.3 Delegation
A trivial solution for delegation is that manager gives the key A; to a lower level directly
through a secure channel. This solution has the following weaknesses
1. Secure channels are very expensive.
2. An impersonation attack can be launched by anyone (either in the group or
outside the group) by giving a "random" wrong key which leads to conference
failure.
In our scheme, we solve the problems by using go-ahead tickets [30]. A go-ahead ticket
can be seen as a proof of delegation. For example, when Px gives the conference key
directly to P 4 by-passing P 2 and P3, the manager knows this condition, since P 3 did
not give his go-ahead ticket to P4.
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After the managers have agreed on the secret key, they can now proceed and delegate
a suitable collection of their subordinates for conference. Let consider the group G.
All participants PJ; i = 1,..., n, keep their secrets X{. The manager keeps the secrets
i-1

Ti — XQ - X{ = Y^ Xj
j=0

for i = 1,... ,n. T h e manager uses the tickets to delegate subordinates for the conference. Messages are transmitted via broadcasting channels. W e show how the manager
P 0 performs the delegation for the group G. The same protocol is run by the manager
of the group G'.
In our scheme, all the communication is done by using a broadcasting channel. The
protocol for the group G takes the following steps.
1. P0 retransmits value R' obtained from the group G' to all members of the group
i.e.,
P 0 -> * : R, R', signPo(H(k, R', R)), signP>Q(H(k, R, R')).
This step is skipped if members already listened and recorded the messages exchanged between managers.
2. P0 forms a subset VQ of participants he wishes to delegate. Next P0 prepares
go-ahead tickets for the participants from VQ-

A go-ahead ticket for Pi (i f=- 0)

has the form
RiaTt

3. P0 -• Pz : (R'a, R'aTi,signPo(H(Xi, xit R'a, R'aT>))
for all

PteVG.

4. Each participant Pj delegated by the manager collects his go-ahead ticket and
the integer R'a and computes the conference key as follows:
k = (R'a)XiR'aTi = (R')aXo = grr'a/3X°x° (mod q).
5. P{ can either accept the delegation or delegates his direct subordinates Pi+X instead. If P{ accepts it, the participant sends the message
Pt -+ P 0 :

signPi(H(Xi,xl,RaT\k)).

The signature of Pi should be personal one not related to the hierarchical structure.
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Clearly, any participant Pj except P n holds an additional integer x{ which can be used
to delegate his subordinate Pi+X. Assuming that Pi+X has already received a copy of
all go-ahead tickets, Pi delegates him by executing the following protocol.
1. Pj -» Pj+i : R'a,R'aTi,R'axi,signPi(H(Xi+x,R,a,R,aTi,R'ax<)).
2. Pi+X calculates the conference key
k = R>aTiR«*XiR'<*Xi+i = (R')°<Xo = grT'a^X'o (mod q).

3. Pj+i can either accept the delegation or delegate his direct subordinates Pi+2
instead. If Pi+X accepts it, the participant sends the message
Pj+i -> P 0 :

signPi+1(H(Xi+x,xi+x,R'aTi,R'aXi,k)).

The manager is in complete control over his group by keeping the secret X0 and
delegating selected subordinates for conference. Note that go-ahead tickets are valid
for a single conference only. Secret keys Xi kept by Pj could be used m a n y times for
different conferences.
T h e delegation structure can be easily modified to the needs of the manager of a
group. Consider some possibilities.
• Only P 0 can delegate subordinates. In this case, Pi (i ^ 0) is assigned X{ only.
A characteristic feature of this delegation is that Pi on lower hierarchy cannot
delegate his replacement for the conference.
• Each Pj can delegate directly m a n y different lower levels if Pj is given corresponding collection of {XJ} where the index j runs through all indices of levels which
can be delegated by Pi.

5.4 Protocol Evaluation
5.4.1 Security
The security of the protocol depends on computational difficulty of two numerical
problems. T h efirstis the discrete logarithm (DL) problem and the second - the
Diffie-Hellman ( D H ) problem. Recall that the D L problem is defined as follows:
Instance: Given an integer y G Z*q and a primitive element g such that it generates Z*.
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Question: W h a t is a discrete logarithm
x

= iogj U (mod q)
(or equivalently y = gx) ?

The DH problem is formulated below.
Instance: Given two integers a = ga m o d q and b

g" m o d q where g is a generator

ofZ*q.

Question: What is the integer c such that
c E5 gafi (mod q)1
It is easy to see that the DH problem is not harder than the DL problem. Consider
that w e have an efficient algorithm which solves D L . In this case, the algorithm can
be used to solve D H . First we extract exponents a and B applying the algorithm and ,,
later compute the integer c. It is unknown whether the existence of efficient algorithm
for D H can help to solve the D L problem.
Key establishment protocols are always judged against the collection of goals specified for them. T h e agreed key must be secret and known to the managers and delegated
participants of both groups. The following theorem makes a precise statement about
secrecy of the conference key.
T h e o r e m 5.1 Assuming

that the applied instance of the DH

problem is intractable

and the hash function H is one-way collision free. Given our key-agreement protocol,
then the conference key k shared by the managers and delegated participants remains

secret to all outsiders and to all participants who are below the lowest delegated level i
the two groups.
Proof. W e define an external view as the collection of public information exchanged
during a run of the protocol. Thus the external view is
Vex = {R, R', R'a, Rp, {R'aT*}ievc, {R^hev^

+ signatures},

Signatures are publicly verifiable so everybody can recover the hash values but finding
any preimage of the values is intractable. T h e consequence of this is that useful data
forfindingk is restricted to

{R, R', R'a, Rp, {R!aT>UvG, { ^ b t f }
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This view can be expanded by public information stored in T A , T R G and T R G > . The
external view represents the knowledge of outsiders about the current run of the protocol. Even if w e assume that all levels have been delegated from both groups, the
outsider sees tickets from G as a sequence of n independent random variables. The
same applies to tickets from G'. So the collection of n + m tickets (independent random
variables) are not helpful for the outsider to solve an instance of the D H problem defined by two integers R and R' and the pair (P /Q , R13). A n internal view is the view of
a participant Pi from the group G (or G') w h o is below the last delegated participant
is
Vin — VexU {Xi,Xi}
The pair of (ATj,Xj) is independent from the tickets and cannot carry any information
about the conference key if Pj is below the last delegated participant (who accepted the
delegation). So the position of the participant is the same as the outsider. W e conclude
that the key A; is secret for all outsiders and participants below the last delegated to
the conference.

O

A nonce a is considered to be fresh if it has not been generated or used before
(during past runs of the protocol). T h e freshness can be forced by keeping record of
all previously generated nonces. This solution has a drawback of being very expensive
especially w h e n the protocol is run m a n y times and needs lot of storage to keep track
of the past nonces. In practice, we are ready to trade off the "unconditional" freshness
with the "probabilistic" one. T h e probabilistic freshness is sufficient in most practical
applications. If nonces are selected independently and randomly from big enough set,
then the probability of choosing non-fresh nonce is negligible. There is no need to
keep record of past nonces but although negligible, there is a possibility of choosing a
non-fresh nonce.
T h e o r e m 5.2 The key k agreed in the protocol is probabilistically fresh assuming a or
B are selected independently at random by managers. The probability of k being reused
is negligible and equal to -^-, where £ is the number of past runs of the protocol.
Proof. Given £ runs of the protocol with pairs of nonces {(ah B{) \i~l,...,£}. The
key k is fresh (not generated before) if aB is different from all previous products a{B{
for i = 1,..., £. It is obvious that for £ runs, there is the probability of reusing one of £
products so it is equal to - ^ • This probability is valid if at least one manager follows
the protocol and chooses his nonce randomly and uniformly from all elements of Z*.
O
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The protocol could be modified by dropping nonces a and B altogether. In this
case the freshness of the key can be ensured by regenerating either public keys of
managers or reinitialising the public keys of the groups. Both m a y be time consuming
and expensive.
The mutual group authentication is done between two managers in the same way as
in the S T S protocol. Also all delegated participants VG independently can authenticate
the group G' by checking whether H(k, R, R') match the hash value extracted from the
signature given by PQ. This same applies to participants delegated in the group G'.
T h e mutual authentication within the group G is based on the assumption that the
manager and the participant Pj share secret (Xi,xA. It is implemented using a typical
challenge-response interaction. T h e manager sends to Pi the challenge
(R'a, R'aT',signPo(H(Xi, x%, R'a, R'aT'))
and Pi acknowledges the delegation by sending
signPi(H(Xl,xl,R!aT\R'ax\k))
After collecting all signed acknowledgements, the manager of the group knows the
collection of active delegates (participants w h o have agreed to take part in conference). This collection m a y differ substantially from the class of participants to w h o m
the manager sent go-ahead tickets. To speed up the cross-group authentication, the
managers m a y broadcast their lists of all active delegates. This is what happens in
real conferences when everybody knows the composition of the conference. If for some
reasons, the list is to be kept secret from other than delegated participants (or their
superiors), both managers m a y broadcast their lists in the form of signed cryptograms.
Encryption is done using the conference key and the signature is created using the
managers' public keys.

5.4.2 Efficiency
The efficiency of a scheme depends on the communication overhead and the complexity
of calculation performed by each participant. T h e communication overhead is the
number of messages each participant needs to send. In the Diffie-Hellman scheme,
the length of each message exchanged between two parties is logp bits for each (A
sends ya = gT«mod p to B and B sends yb = gr»mod p to A ) . In our protocol, at
the key agreement phase, the managers send only one message to each other, so the
communication overhead is counted as one. In the key delegation phase, the managers
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broadcast their go-ahead tickets to the lower levels, so the communication overhead
is counted also as one. T h e lower levels can calculate the c o m m o n key straight away.
The lower levels can compute their go-ahead tickets and delegate the levels below
them. T h e communication overhead is counted as one. In summary, the managers
send two messages each. Participants of lower levels send a single message only if they
want to delegate some body. Overall, the execution of the protocol will involve the
transmission of at most 2n messages. The computational overhead can be expressed
by the number of exponentiation processing to execute the protocol (exponentiation is
the most expansive operation). In the key agreement phase, the calculations done by
managers take two exponentiation for each. In the delegation phase, when a manager
prepares a go-ahead ticket, he needs to perform one exponentiation. The lower level
participants need to calculate their go-ahead tickets take one exponentiation. The total
number of exponentiation is at most 2n.

5.5 Conclusion

In the real world, hierarchical groups are prevalent and always present in any institu
or organization. W e have proposed an efficient key agreement protocol for hierarchical
groups. W e gave a solution for establishing a conference among members of hierarchical
groups, which provided a fresh secret key establishment, mutual group authentication
and mutual authentication insurance for key delegation process. W e used a public
channel in order to provide a low cost in communication, and still provided a secure
conference scheme. O u r scheme can be easily adapted to a multi hierarchical groups
by employing an approach mentioned in [35].

Chapter 6
A N e w Class of Multi-Party Key
Agreement Protocols
6.1

Introduction

Most cryptographic tools can only be used if appropriate cryptographic keys are known
to the parties. T h e intrinsic difficulty of key establishment in large computer networks
has led to invention of public-key cryptography where one of the keys can be m a d e
public simplifying considerably the problem of key establishment. There are two well
known categories of key establishment protocols: key transport and key agreement.
Key transport protocols enable two communicating parties to obtain a c o m m o n secret key by using pre-established secure communication channels between them and
a trusted third party ( T T P ) . Normally, T T P is responsible for generation of a fresh
secret key and the parties gratefully accept it.
Key agreement protocols, on the other hand, allow the parties to interact with each
other so as the result, they can derive a c o m m o n secret key. Moreover, they influence
equally thefinalform of the secret. Although the T T P is not directly involved in the
protocol, its existence is crucial as it provides the public keys of the parties, typically, in
the form of proper certificates (or public keys signed by T T P ) . Note also that T T P has
no access to the secret agreed between the parties. That is w h y in some applications,
key agreement is preferred to key transport.
A natural evolution of cryptography has given rise to the so-called multi-party
cryptography (also termed group or society oriented) with a key establishment protocol
as its integral part. Traditionally, the multi-party key establishment is also called
conference key establishment.
In this chapter, a n e w class of multi-party key agreement protocols was proposed.
The properties of secret sharing were used to provide the group authentication and
share divide ability so the threshold of principals to start a conference is more flexible.
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A New Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol

The proposed key agreement applies secret sharing generated independently by principals. A s s u m e that there are n principals Px,...,Pn w h o are eligible to participate
in conference. Each principal P^, i = l,...,n, creates her o w n Shamir secret sharing defined by a polynomial fi(z) and distributes shares to the members of the group
using pre-arranged secure channels. T h e combined secret sharing is defined by the
polynomial

F(z)=±fi(z)
i=l

Note that the secret P(0) generated collectively by the group is not known until the
principals decide to pool their shares together to recover the secret. Moreover, the
principals contribute "equally" to the fresh secret. T h e protocol progresses through
three major phases:
1. registration - each principal w h o wants to join the conference register herself with
a trusted registry,
2. initialisation - each principal creates her private secret sharing scheme and distributes shares to all other principals,
3. call for conference - principals broadcast their shares and therefore enable themselves to recover a c o m m o n secret key.

6.2.1 Assumptions
Our assumptions are listed as follows:
• there are n principals {Pi,..., P n } w h o want to joint the conference,
• there exists a trusted registry (R) w h o manages the registration of principals. In
particular, the registry keeps a list of public keys of principals,
• public information accessible from the registry is authenticated by the registry.
Typically, information is accessible in a form of certificates signed by R,
• secure channels provide both secrecy and authentication. Broadcast channels
deliver authenticated messages to all principals (messages can be read by all but
nobody can modify them without detecting the modification).
Let p and q denote large primes such that q divides p - 1 . Let Gq be a subgroup of
Z* of order q and g be a generator of Gq.
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Registration

The principal Pj chooses her own private key x{ e Z* and submits her public key
h{ = gXi

(mod p) for i = 1,..., n to the registry R. After all principals have completed

their registration, the registry R displays a read-only list of public keys together with
principals' names. Additionally, R generates a random integer r eR Z* on demand and
displays a = gr for a short period of time. Normally, the value is generated whenever a
need for conference arises (indicated by principals w h o wish to call a conference). This
value is erased after some time (when the conference hasfinished).The same value a
is never used in two different conferences.
Registration serves three purposes. Thefirstone is that each principal knows other
principals w h o are to join the conference. The second one is that the public keys can be
used to implement secure channels between principals. For example, the information
provided by registry is enough to encrypt a message using the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Assume that m

6 Z* and Pi wants to send the message to Pj in encrypted form.

First Pj chooses a random integer v € Z* and computes gv, h" and m x hv,. The pair
(gv,m x /ij) is sent to Pj. The receiver Pj takes the pair and computes (gv)Xj = gVXj
which later can be used to extract the message m = m x hvj x g~vxi. The third purpose
is to supply principals with fresh (random) elements a which are later used in the
protocol.

6.2.3 Initialisation
This phase of the protocol is executed independently by each principal and proceeds
as follows:
1. Pi designs a (n + l,2n) Shamir threshold scheme, i.e. a scheme with 2n shares
and with threshold n + 1 . Let the scheme be defined by a random polynomial
fi(z) of degree at most n. Suppose that
fi(z) = aifi + aijXz + ... + a^nzn
where coefficients aid <E Z* are chosen at random for j = 1,..., n. As usual in
Shamir scheme, shares are computed for 2n public z co-ordinates. W e assume
that Pi is assigned a pair of co-ordinates z+ = (2i - 1, 2i).
2. Next Pj prepares pairs of shares Sij = fi(zj) — (sifj = fi(2j - l),Sjj = fi(W)3. Finally, P{ communicates sf] to the principal P;; j = 1,... ,n; j ^ % via a
secure channel. In effect, Pi obtains a sequence of n elements (su,..., sn>i) and
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computes her secret share s}2) = £"=i s$ where sf} - F(2i) and the polynomial

F(z) = T3=lMz).
Note that the secret s = F(0) = £ " = 1 aj,0 is never exposed to principals. From now on
s = F(0) will be called a seed to differentiate it from a fresh secret key obtained by all
principals involved in the conference.

6.2.4 Call for Conference
To start the conference, principals execute the following steps.
1. Pj contacts the registry and fetches necessary parameters including a = gr (the
registry selects r at random). If the element a is not on display, Pi asks R for
one.
2. Pi prepares public shares /3jj — aSi-j for j = 1,..., n.
3. Pi broadcasts Bij to all principals j = 1,..., n.
4. After Pi has obtained Bj^ from other principals, she recovers n public shares

i=\

for j = l,...,n.
i2\

5. Pj uses n public shares and her secret share, £• to recover the c o m m o n secret
S = a F ( 0 ) = as. Note that principals still use the Lagrange interpolation but for
exponents so

p

S=a

b

n

/

-(i)\bJ
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are Lagrange coefficients.
6. P{ takes the secret S, her n a m e id{, and a and prepares a string a = H(S\\idi\\a)
where H is a cryptographically strong, collision resistant hash function with a
public description. T h e triplet (a,id{,a) is broadcast (note that broadcasting
channel is assumed to provide authentication).
7. P{ collects (a,idj,a) from other principals, checks their authenticity and verifies
them using her o w n secret S. If the checks hold, P ? is ready for the conference.
Otherwise, Pj announces the error and aborts the protocol.
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6.2.5 Security Analysis
The following theorem describes which security goals are achievable by the protocol.
Theorem 6.1 Assume that the protocol is run by a group of honest principals, then the

protocol attains the following security goals: (1) key freshness, (2) key confidentiality,
(3) group authentication, (4) key confirmation.
Proof. (1) The registry displays an integer a = gr for a random r eR Z*. Note
that the c o m m o n secret key S = grs = as is fresh as log as r is fresh. The freshness is
probabilistic.
(2) Key confidentiality holds as after broadcasting the shares a3u, all outsiders know
n public shares only. A s the Shamir scheme is perfect, it means that n shares do not
provide any information about the secret when the threshold is n + 1. The perfectness
argument can only be used if the secret sharing is used once. For a multiple use, which
is the case, principals should be sure that the threshold of the group secret sharing is
exactly ( n + 1 ) . A simple way to decide whether the threshold is (n + 1), is to check
if the secret derived according to the protocol by a principal is the same as the value
obtained by the Lagrange interpolation of public shares only. If the two values are the
same the threshold is not equal to (n + 1). It is easy to verify that the probability of
the threshold being (n + 1) is (1 — q~l).
(3) Group authentication (by contradiction). Assume that the protocol has been successful, the group authentication does not hold. From this assumption we will derive
that either instances of the Discrete Logarithm are easy to invert (which is the requested contradiction). From our assumptions we know that there is at least one
principal, say Pj, w h o has not participated in the protocol. As the threshold of the
secret sharing is (n + 1), somebody had to broadcast the prescribed collection of public
shares Bj^ = as^{; i = 1,..., n, on behalf of Pj. This can be done only if either the
shares SjJ can be extracted from public shares announced in the previous runs or the
random r can be extracted from a = gr. This leads us to the conclusion that the
Discrete Logarithm instances used are easy which is a contradiction.
(4) After the conference has been called, every principal can check whether other principals are holding the same secret by verifying the triplets (cr, idj, a) for all j ^ i. The
key confirmation is satisfied.

O

W h a t if a subgroup of principals does not follow the protocol ? Let us consider the
following possibilities:
1. At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intentionally lower the thresholds

6.2. A New Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol

85

used in their private secret sharing schemes. This does not effect the work of the
protocol as if at least one principal is honest, the threshold will be random and
equal to (n + 1 ) with the probability (1 - q~l). T h e subgroup of conspirators can
establish a conference but they compromise the confidentiality of their secret see Theorem 6.2.
2. At the initialisation stage, the subgroup can intentionally increase the threshold
of their private schemes, then at the call for conference stage, the principals w h o
are honest will recover inconsistent secrets and will abort the conference - see
Theorem 6.3.
3. At the call for conference stage, the subgroup can broadcast modified shares of
their private schemes. This will be detected by honest principals when the secret
is verified.
4. A disobedient principal Pi can make public his secret sharing scheme (the polynomial fi(z)). T h e conference can still be called but without involvement of Pj.
This is another w a y of saying - call conference whenever you wish. Pj can still
participate in conferences if her share S-2 remains secret. If Pj goes further and
discloses S^2), then the secret key becomes public if the rest of principals follows
the protocol. Otherwise if some principals refrain from broadcasting their public
shares, the conference will not go ahead.
Theorem 6.2 Given a group ofn principals Px,...,Pn who participate in the protocol.
Assume that there is a subgroup Px,...,Pk principals who lowered the threshold of their
private secret sharing schemes so
degfi(z) = k
fori~l,...,k and k < n. Then the subgroup can work with their own secret sharing
based on the polynomial

G(z) = £/<(*)
i=i

with the secret S' = a

G(0)

. This secret is known to the whole group Px,...,Pn and

indeed to all outsiders.
Proof. If all principals broadcast their public shares, then each principal can compute
the secret S = aF^

where F(z) = I? = 1 /<(*)• A principal Pt; £ = 1,... ,n, can
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compute S' = aG{0) by simply ignoring all information obtained from participants not
belonging the the subgroup. In particular, Pt computes her secret share

and at the call for conference stage, calculates the following n public shares

i=l

As the secret sharing of the subgroup has the threshold (k + 1), the Lagrange interpolation gives the same secret S' = aG^

for any subset of k public shares. The subgroup

can agree on the secret which is known to the whole group. Moreover, an outsider can
recover the secret S' = aG^

from any (k + 1) public shares. The subgroup m a y have

a conference which is public.

O

Theorem 6.3 Given a group ofn principals Px,..., Pn who participate in the protocol.

Assume that there is a dishonest principal Px who deviates from the protocol by selecting
her random polynomial fx(z) of degree (n + 1). Then honest principals Pj/ z = 2,..., n
detect this at thefirstrun of the protocol during the key confirmation stage.
Proof. Without the loss of generality, we ignore exponentiation so in other words,
in the call for conference stage principals broadcast their shares s\j (instead of prescribed aSi<j). T h e proof is conducted by contradiction. Assume that there is a pair of
principals w h o recovers the same secret. Let them be P 2 and P3. The secret sharing
created by the group in the initialisation stage is defined by polynomial

F(z) = jtfi(z).
i=i

As deg/i(z) = n + 1, the degree of F(z) is also (n + 1). P 2 applies the Lagrange
interpolation for the following (n + 1) points:

(4,42)),(l,5{1)),...,(2n-l,5W)
where Sf] = F(2j - 1) and S{22) = F(4) and finds a polynomial G2(z). Similarly, P3
knows

(6,42)),(l,5{1)),...,(2n-l,5«)
where Sf] = F(6) and determines a unique polynomial G3(z) which contains the
points. Both G2(z) and G3(z) are of degree at most n. If both P 2 and P 3 recover
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the same secret, it means that G2(0) = G3(0). As the polynomials G2(z) and Gz(z)
contains (n + 1) c o m m o n points ((1, s f >),..., (2n - 1, S^) and (0, G2(0))), they have
to be identical so G2(z) = G3(z). O n the other hand, knowing (n + 2) points
(4,42)),(6,5f),(l,5{1)),...,(2n-l,5W)
one could find F(z) using the Lagrange interpolation. Note that these points also
belong to G2(z) so F(z) = G2(z).

This implies that degP(z) = n which is our

requested contradiction.

O

W e claim that the protocol can be used repeatedly to call conferences as the seed s
remains secret and to recover the fresh secret key S, the principals need to use secret
sharing to compute it.
Recall that the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is defined as follows. Given the
modulus N, the element g and h = gx m o d N. W h a t is x ?
Assume that principals have been running the protocol £ times. W e define a view
Vt(£) of principal Pj which specifies the information available to Pi after £ successful
execution of the protocol. It is easy to verify that
Vi{C) = {fi(z),Sl2)-^ (setup stage)
5 (1)

ai,ai L ,...,axn

cO)

,asx—> (1st run)

s(1) sa)
ai,ael ,... ,atn ,a\-+
+ public information }

(£-th run)

where ax,...,ai are random values generated by R. Note that the strings ai,j generated for key confirmation purpose, are omitted from the view. The reason is that the
assumption that the hash function is cryptographically strong is not enough to draw
any conclusions about the overall security of the protocol. It is expected that hash
function must not share any homomorphic property with exponentiation (see [55]),
Theorem 6.4 Given the protocol without key confirmation. If the principals honestly

follow the protocol and run it successfully £ times and the applied discrete logarithm in

stances are intractable, then the seed s remains unknown to principals (and outsiders).
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that the seed can be obtained from a view
Vi(£) using a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm A which takes the view as an
input and returns the seed, or ,4(Vj(^)) = 5. Consider an intractable instance of

6.2. A New Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol

88

the D L problem defined by the pair (h,g) such that h = gx. For this instance, we
create a view VDL(£).

In order to do this, w e need to design a secret sharing for

gx. W e select at random integer Un+X eR Z* and and 6X = gu\...,8n_x = gu«-K
Points (1, gK), (3, gU2)..., (2n - 3, gu»-*) together with (0, gx) and (2, gu^)

uniquely

determine the point (2n - 1, gu») using the Lagrange interpolation for exponents. T h e
view generated for the D L instance has the following form:
VDL(£)

= {f'(z),Un+x,
ax = gri,ax\...,a^n,ax

= hri ->• (1st run)

ae = gTl, autx,..., autn ,ax = hn ->• (£-th run)
+ public information }
where f'(z), and (ax,..., ag) are random elements generated according to the protocol
specification. W e argue that views V{(£) and VDL(£) are statistically indistinguishable
[82]. This is true as all elements are selected randomly and uniformly. N o w we can
input the view VDL(£)

into the algorithm A. If the algorithm works for the view Vi(£),

it must also work for the view VDL(£)

as both views are statistically indistinguishable.

This means that A returns x and solve the intractable instance of the D L problem.
This is requested contradiction which proves the claim.

O.

Consider the efficiency of the protocol. T h efirstpart in which principals design their
private secret sharing schemes is not computationally intensive. The reconstruction of
the secret key S and the key verification constitute the main computational overhead.
To reconstruct the secret key, principals have tofirstcompute their public shares and
later use the Lagrange interpolation to recover the polynomial a F ( z ) and the secret
S =

aF^.

Communication overhead for the protocol consists of two components. T h efirstone
involves confidential delivery of the shares sf] from any single principal to others - this
consumes ( n - 1 ) confidential transmissions for every principal. The second component
consists of broadcasting shares Bit = a$i>i. This takes n broadcast transmissions for
all principals. Table 6.1 summarises the communication and computation overhead for
the protocol.
Our protocol compares favourably with other key agreement protocols. For example, the protocols by Burmester and Desmedt [11] are designed with a specific network
configuration in mind. T h e most evident weakness of their protocols seems to be the
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lack of principal authentication. Just and Vaudenay [35] incorporated the authentication of principals into the Burmester-Desmedt protocols but the authentication can be
achieved with the neighbouring principals only.

registration

communication
(message sent by
each principal)
1 message sent to
registry

« 2 n 2 multiplications and
additions for computations of
shares

preparation
Setup
distribution

Share broadcast
Call for
conference

Key
Calculation
Key
Confirmation

computation
(calculations done by
each principal)
1 exponentiation

n messages sent to
other principals
via secure channel
n broadcasts -

1 message broadcasts

n exponentiations
n exponentiations
(n + 1) exponentiations
(Lagrange interpolation)
Hashing of
a single message and
1 exponentiation
for authentication
.

1

Table 6.1: Communication and computation requirements for the main protocol

6.3

A (t, n) Multi-Party Key Agreement

In general, conferences do not need the whole group to be active. Assume that out
of n members of the group, t are allowed to call on the conference (t < n). T h e
straightforward application of the previous protocol will not work. Note that after the
principals set up collectively the (t+1, 2n) secret sharing, any group of active principals
larger than t will compromise the confidentiality of the agreed key. O n e would solve
this problem by requesting principals w h o are about to broadcast their public shares
tofirstcontact the registry and ask it for permission. In this case, the registry keeps
account w h o has already contacted it and got permission. S o m e other possibilities are:
. to introduce additional phase in which participants announces the intention of
broadcasting a public shares by showing a random number. After the phase
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lapses, principals order the numbers. Only t top ones are allowed to participate
in the share broadcasting,
• to broadcast public shares in encrypted form. Later active principals order their
encrypted shares and only t top principals broadcast the corresponding decryption keys. This can be an attractive option as encryption can be based on a fast
block cipher such as the D E S algorithm.
T h e solution w e present here is a modification of the main protocol which preserve
the overall structure and more importantly, security evaluation obtained for the main
protocol is also valid here. T h e registration phase is as before. In the initialisation
phase, all principals have to be active and each principal Pj
• designs her o w n (t + l,t + 1) Shamir secret sharing defined by the polynomial
fi(z) and computes (t + 1) shares s{j — fi(j) where j = 1,..., t + 1,
• prepares n auxiliary shares e^j such that
Si,l

£i,i

= X x
S

i,t

£i,n

where X is public (n x t) matrix whose any collection of t rows constitutes a
nonsingular matrix,

• distributes auxiliary shares to her fellow principals so Pj gets eid for j = 1,..., n;
j ^ i via secure channels and additionally siit+i is communicated securely to all
other principals,
• composes auxiliary shares into a single auxiliary share
n

Si = S

£

^3

3=1

and merges shares sijt+i so
n

St+l ~ z2 si,t+l
i=l

this share is c o m m o n for all principals.

Principals collectively set up a (t + 1, t + 1) Shamir secret sharing with the underlyi
polynomial

F(z)=fJh(z)
i=i
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Denote shares S{ = F(i). Any collection of t or more different auxiliary shares allows
to recover the shares (Sx,...,St). Again St+X is known to all principals.
T o trigger the conference, there must be at least t active principals. Without the loss
of generality, assume that the active set A = {Px,..., Pt} and each P f e A performs
the following steps:
1. contacts the registry and fetches necessary parameters including a = gr (the
registry selects r at random). If the element a is not on display, Pj asks R for
one.
2. prepares public share fa = aEi and broadcasts it,
3. computes first shares (aSl,... ,aSt) using Lagrange interpolation (this step is
identical to that used to recover the secret for Shamir scheme - again note that
computations are done on exponents) and later calculates a c o m m o n key S =
a F ( 0 ) using the complete set of shares (aSl,..., aSt+1).
4. Pi takes the secret S, her name idi, and a and prepares a string a = H(S\\idi\\a)
where if is a cryptographically strong, collision resistant hash function with a
public description. T h e triplet (a, idi, a) is broadcast (note that broadcasting
channel is assumed to provide authentication).
5. Pi collects (a,idj,a) from other principals, checks their authenticity and verifies
them using her o w n secret S. If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference.
Otherwise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol.
The protocol achieves the same security goals as the main one. If a run of the
protocol is successful, all currently active principals know that there are at least t of
them are in the group and the last steps allow them to identify them.
T h e modified protocol has the following remarkable properties.
1. A principal who does not belong to A, can always join the conference later by
using the public shares and key confirmation strings e.
2. A principal not in A can attend the conference passively, i.e. collect all public
information which allow her to obtain the secret key. Later she can read all the
information exchanged during the conference without others knowing that she is
present.
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3. It is possible to add a n e w principal to the conference (enrolment). It is enough
that a newcomer designs her private secret sharing and distributes her shares to
other m e m b e r s and other members give her their shares.

6.4 Conclusions
Principals involved in the protocols generate their own secret sharing schemes and use
secure channels to distribute shares a m o n g themselves. In effect, they jointly create
the group secret sharing. For a single run, principals use broadcasting to announce
their public shares and use secret shares to compute the secret key. Note that the
(n + 1, 2n) secret sharing used in thefirstprotocol can be replaced by (n + 1, n + 1)
secret sharing. In this case, each principal has two shares and one of them is c o m m o n
for all principals.
Note that the second version of the protocol which can be run by any t out on n
principals, uses a variant of secret sharing in which any t active principals are able to
reconstruct t public shares (and recover the key using the c o m m o n secret share).
Assume that a group of principals already holds collectively a secret via a (t, n)
secret sharing. Is it possible to design a protocol which enables the group to agree on
a key. T h e answer seems to be affirmative. Consider a possible solution based on the
concept of divisible shares [50]. T h e principals take their shares and "divide" them
into two parts: one will be used to produce public shares (using exponentiation) and
the second is used to compute the c o m m o n key. T h e effective threshold would be in
general m u c h higher than t. If principals decide collectively to split their shares in
two, then the effective threshold would be 2t - 1 as if 2t - 1 principals pool their share
halves together, they will k n o w (t - 1/2) public shares. This together with their secret
halves allows them to recover the c o m m o n key.

Chapter 7
Multi-Party Key Transport Protocols
Based on Secret Sharing

7.1

Introduction

This chapter investigated application of secret sharing for multi-party key distributio
From chapter 1.2 it is suggested that entity authentication typically very expensive
needs to be replaced by two weaker forms of authentication called group and threshold
authentication. T h e protocols presented in this chapter are based on Shamir schemes
and exponentiation. T h e group protocol allows to call on the conference only if the
whole group is active. T h e threshold protocol can be successfully run if a big enough
number of principals is active (equal to or bigger than threshold t). Goals achieved in
these protocols and their efficiency are discussed. In conclusions, it is shown that any
secret sharing scheme can be converted into a group multi-party key transport M K T
protocol.

7.2 Goals of Multi-Party Key Transport
MKT protocols can be evaluated by taking into account how efficient they are to run
and which goals they achieve. T h e main security goals for key establishment protocols
are [55]: (1) key freshness, (2) entity authentication, (3) key confirmation, (4) key
authentication, and (5) explicit key authentication.(see section 3.2)
Group authentication can be performed by checking whether the shares provided are
consistent with the recovered secret. Share consistency verification can be performed
using
1. secret sharing with cheating detection (unconditional security) [10, 49, 85],
2. verifiable secret sharing (conditional security) [65].
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The fact that the group has recovered the (correct) secret is enough to draw the conclusion that all principals had to be active within a given time frame when shares were
collected. In this context explicit key confirmation implies group authentication.
A similar statement can be m a d e about threshold group authentication. This time
however, any active participant can only m a k e an assertion that the active subgroup A
consists oft or more principals. This certainly is the case when the shares are just tokens
without any relation to the participants w h o holds them. To facilitate authentication
of the currently active subgroup, one can contemplate shares to be related to their
holders. This is what happens in the Shamir scheme when the underlying polynomial
f(x) indicates the value of the share s for a public co-ordinates x or s = f(x). The
shares s are kept secret by their holders while x are displayed by the T A .

7.3 Assumptions
To make MKT protocols efficient we assume that
all communication among principals is done via broadcasting channel.
Broadcast messages are displayed on a public notice-board.
Authenticated (signed) broadcasting enables all receivers to identify the sender of
the received message and to detect illegal modifications. W e assume that there is a
group V = {Pi,..., Pn} of principals w h o wants to call a conference. W e assume also
that there is a trusted authority (TA) w h o
1. lists the members of the group in a read-only authenticated registry that is publicly accessible,
2. keeps public keys of principals certified by the secret key of TA,
3. creates a Shamir secret sharing (t, m) over GF(q) with threshold t and m shares
for a fresh secret key. Suppose that t = n+l,

m = n + 2, and the underlying

polynomial is f(x). Shares are computed as Si = f(xi) for i = 1,..., n + 2 for
publicly known x{ and the secret is s = /(0). It is known that Pi is assigned Xj
and therefore her share is Si =

/(XJ).

T h e values of Xj are also available from the

read-only registry,
4. distributes shares to the group V via secure channels (with secrecy and authenticity) so each P{ gets her share Sj and two shares sn+i a n d sn+2,
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5. generates a fresh primitive element g £R GF(q) and keeps it for a short period of
time (enough to call a single conference) in the read-only authenticated registry.

7.4 Group Multi-Party Key Transport Protocols
The protocol enables a group of principals to call on the conference. The protocol may
only be successful w h e n all principals in the group are active.
Assumptions: Given a (n + 1, n + 2) threshold scheme over V = {Px,..., Pn] based
on a polynomial f(x) of degree precisely n. Each principal Pj holds three shares:
Si = f(xi) G S, sn+x = f(xn+x) and sn+2 = /(x n + 2 ) (i = 1,..., n). All principals
collect a fresh g from the public registry. T h e public values Xj are also available
from the public registry.
Steps: 1. Pi —> * : gSi, i.e. Pj broadcasts her share gSi; % — 1,..., n and its value is
displayed on the public notice-board. This step must be performed by all
principals in a fixed time interval. If the interval lapses and some principals
have failed to broadcast their shares, the protocol must be re-initialised by
the T A (i.e. T A re-generates g).
2. Knowing n public shares and sn+x, each principal Pz uses the Lagrange
interpolation and finds the pair gf{-°\ gKx*+2\

P{firstverifies whether

gf(xn+2) _L gSn+2^ ift h e check holds she accepts the secret S = #/(0). Otherwise, Pi aborts the protocol.
3. Pi takes the secret S, her n a m e id{, and a timestamp TSj and prepares a
signed string et = (H(S\\idt\\TSi))Pi where H is a cryptographically strong,
collision resistant hash function with a public description and (m)Pi stands
for a signature of m generated by Pi. T h e triplet (e^id^TSA

is signed by

Pi and broadcast.
4. P{ collects (£j,idj,TSj) and verifies them using her o w n secret S. If the
checks hold, Pj is ready for the conference. Otherwise, Pj announces the
error and aborts the protocol.
N o w w e can prove that the protocol can be used multiple times as the secret s will
never be exposed throughout the (polynomial) lifetime of the protocol.
Theorem 7.1 Given the conditionally secure MKT protocol described above. Assume
that all principals keep their shares secret and listen to the messages broadcast during a
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polynomial-size runs of the protocol, then they are not able to compute the secret s eS
provided the Discrete Logarithm instance is intractable.
Proof.
B y contradiction. Assume that a principal after a polynomial-size samples of the
protocol runs is able to find the secret s = /(0). From this assumption we will deduce
that the D L instance is easy.
W efirstdefine a view of a principal. The view is a collection of public information
accessible to the principal plus principal o w n secret information. From our assumption
we deduce that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A which outputs the
secret s for any view whose size is polynomially bounded. A principal Pi can solve a
D L instance by using the algorithm A. Let the instance in Pi hands, be defined by g,
gs and the modulus q.
1. Pj defines a view simulator for the DL instance. To do this, Pj creates a secret
sharing with the secret s and shares sx,..., sn making calculations on exponents
and producing a transcript for it T = {gs\... ,gSn, Si,g}. The transcript is used
by. a principal Pi to generate the view:
V; = {gas\...,gas",sl,ga\aeRGF(q)\0}
where a GR GF(q)\0 means that a is chosen at random from all nonzero elements
of GF(q). R a n d o m selection of primitive element is replaced by random selection
of a and taking gQ as the new random primitive element in the current run of
the protocol. Needless to say V* must be of a polynomial size.
2. The view V1 observed from Pi point of view contains messages broadcast during polynomial-size runs of the protocol. This view would be generated by the
protocol if the protocol used the same parameters as the simulator.
3. We observe that the views VlB and Vi are statistically indistinguishable (in the
sense [87]).
4. If our probabilistic algorithm A works for V\ then it must work on V* and must
return the secret s with a high probability. So the D L instance is easy. This is
our requested contradiction.
O

7.4. Group Multi-Party Key Transport Protocols

T h e o r e m 7.2 Let the principals follow the protocol and the assumptions hold, then the
protocol achieves: (1) key freshness, (2) key confidentiality, (3) group authentication,
and (4) key confirmation.

Proof. The goal (1) holds as the TA always selects a (probabilistically) fresh primitiv
element g € GF(g). Principals m a y also try to recover the secret key knowing keys from
previous runs of the protocol. Assume that the protocols used two primitive elements
0i,02- Clearly, if the next element g3 — gxg2, then principals can derive the secret from
the transcripts of previous runs of the protocol. Being more specific, assume that a
principal took part in £ runs of the protocol so she knows £ secrets g{,...,g\. T o derive
the secret gj+l for the next run, the principal must be able to factor

9e+i = 9? 9? .. - 9?
or discover integers ax,..., ag which is clearly not easier than the Discrete Logarithm.
(2) Note that key confidentiality applies for the outsiders. B y contradiction. Assume
that the key confidentiality does not hold. So after broadcasting of n one-time shares
gSl,... ,gSn, an outsider can determine the secret S = gs. This implies that the secret
sharing has the threshold smaller than n which is the requested contradiction.
(3) Note that the broadcasting must be completed within a fixed time interval so once
a principal successfully verifies that gf(x*+2) = gSn+2, she knows that all principals must
have delivered correct shares. This implies that the whole group has been active with
the probability 1 — q~l. In other words, if an outsider wants to trigger the conference
and broadcasts a fake share, then the recovered polynomial f(x) m a y contain the point
(xn+2,sn+2)

with the probability g _1 . T h e group authentication is achieved.

(4) Note that after broadcasting all principals know precisely the same collection of
shares. So if the recovered polynomial passes the verification gf^Xn+2^ ~ gSn+2, they are
confident (with the probability 1 - q~l) that they have recovered the c o m m o n secret
shared by all m e m b e r s of the group V.

^

Note that in the proof, steps (3) and (4) of the protocol seem to be redundant.
This is the case if the share sn+2 is used for cheating verification. If, however, the share
sn+2 is not used then group authentication and key confirmation cannot be achieved
without the steps (3) and (4).
H o w principals can misbehave ? Consider some obvious options.
1. One or more principals have not broadcast their shares. After the time interval
lapses, the conference is aborted.
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2. A principal Pk broadcasts a fake share. Other principals recover a polynomial

gf{T) j. ^/(X) r p ^ y accept ^ g

C O n f e r e n c e call

Jf gf(Xn+2) J_ gSn+2^

Thig

^ J

happen

with probability (1 - q-1) if Pk selects her fake share at random.
3. A principal Pk broadcasts a wrong share either gSn+1 or gSn+2. This will be
detected by all honest principals and the conference is likely to be aborted.
4. A principal Pk broadcast additional shares either gSn+1 or gSn+2. The key confidentiality is lost and this always will be detected by honest principals.
One can argue that the existence of the trusted authority diminishes the practicality
of the presented protocols. W e n o w investigate h o w the power of the T A can be reduced. T h e role of the T A is defined in the Section 7.3. T h e listing of group members
(the assumption 1) can be kept and maintained by principals when they are enrolled
into secret sharing. Public keys need to be available in the form of publicly verifiable certificates. This is a typical assumption for any protocol which uses public-key
cryptography and there are m a n y trust infrastructures which provide this service. T h e
secret sharing scheme m a y not be set up by the T A (assumptions 3 and 4). Instead,
it can be created in a distributed w a y using a protocol [25] which is communication
expensive and require the existence of secure channels. T h e assumption 5 can also
be satisfied without the existence of T A . A possible solution could involve a two stage
negotiation of the fresh primitive element. In thefirststage, principals select randomly
their individual fresh elements and broadcast commitments. In the second stage, the
active principals reveal their individual elements and the group element is a product
of all individual element whose commitments were announced in thefirststage.

7.5 Threshold Multi-Party Key Transport Protocols
Now we generalise our protocol to the setting when the group of principals is V =
{Pi,..., P n } and it is requested to allow any t principals to call the conference (t < n).
To do this, w e need to m a k e sure that
1. the key S — gs remains secret if the number of active principals is larger than
t. Note that a straightforward extension of the previous protocol discloses the
secret always w h e n the number of active principals is larger than t,
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2. the secret remains undetermined if precisely (t - 1) principals are active. Again
the previous protocol would allow inactive principals to recover the key.
T h efirstobstacle can be addressed by letting the T A distribute values a{ which are
related to shares via a system of linear equations. More precisely, principals are given
CTJ e GF(q); i — 1,..., n such that

o-x
0"2

Si

= X X

0~n

S2

St

where X is a (n x t) matrix with entries from GF(q) and every (t x t) submatrix is
nonsingular. Note that any t or more values <7j pinpoint shares (sx,... ,st).
A n alternative using two related secret sharing schemes also solves the problem.
In this solution, the T A first designs a (2, 2) threshold scheme. Let the two shares be
u, v € # GF(g) and the secret s = u + v

(mod q). The second scheme is (t, n) Shamir

scheme with underlying polynomial f(x) of degree precisely t. Principal Pi gets the
share Sj =

/(XJ);

i = 1,..., n. T h e secret is u = /(0). W e are going to use the second

solution in our protocol presented below.
The second difficulty can be overcome by asking principals to indicate their willingness to call the conference. So prior to broadcasting gSi, each principal broadcasts
her commitment in the form
Pj,T5,, (H(gs>,rhX,...,rhg,TSi,Pi))Pl
where H is a cryptographically strong hash function, TSj is a timestamp indicating
timeliness of the commitment, and the string riA,.. .,r{/ is an agreed representation
of g$i, T h e commitments are signed by Pj. If the number of broadcast commitments
is (t - 1) or less the call for conference is aborted. If the number is t or larger, each
principal gradually releases value gSi by broadcasting rid in £ rounds. If at any round,
a principal fails to broadcast the next rid, the protocol is aborted.
N o w we are ready to describe the protocol. The T A sets up the protocol by first
designing a (2, 2) scheme with two shares u, v G GF(g) such that s = u + v

(mod q).

Next the T A designs (t + l,n + 2) threshold scheme with shares Si = f{xA; i =
1,..., n + 2 and the secret u = f(Q). T h e T A delivers the sequence (s^ sn+x, sn+2, u)
to principal Pi via secure (confidential and authenticated) channel.

Threshold MKT Protocol
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A s s u m p t i o n s : There is a group V = {Pi,..., P n } of principals. The T A designs two
secret sharing schemes: (2, 2) with shares u, v and secret s = u+v and (t+1, n + 2 )
with shares Sj = f(x{); i = 1,..., n + 2 and secret u = /(0). The degree of /(x)
is precisely t. Each principal holds her shares (s{, $n+x,sn+2,u).

T h e T A keeps

the list of all principals, the list of public values Xj for i = 1,... ,n + 2, public
keys of principals for signature verification and a fresh primitive element g. The
key is S = gs.
Steps: 1. P{ -> • : Pj,T5j, (H(gSi,riA,... ,r^,T5j, P,))^. Principals broadcast
their signed commitments. If the number of active principals is smaller
than t, the protocol is aborted.
2. For £ rounds
Pj —>• * : rjj. If any round is incomplete (i.e. one or more principals have
failed to announce rjj), principals abort the protocol.
3. After getting all gSi for the currently active principals (let them be Px,... ,Pt),
they check the consistency of commitments with gSi and their timeliness.
4. Knowing t or more pairs (xi,gSi) and the c o m m o n share sn+x, each principal
Pi applies Lagrange interpolation and finds gf^. Next she verifies whether
gf{xn+2) -± gsn+2

if ^ g check fails, she announces the error and aborts.

Otherwise, she recovers the key g3 = gvg^°> •
5. Pi takes the secret gs, her n a m e idi, and a timestamp TSi and prepares
a string e{ =

(H(gs\\idi\\TSi))Pi where H is a cryptographically strong,

collision-free hash function with a public description. The triplet (ei7 id*, T5j)
is broadcast and displayed on the notice-board.
6. Px collects (EJ, idj,TSj) and verifies them using the public key of the sender
Pj and her o w n secret gs. If the checks hold, Pt is ready for the conference.
Otherwise, P{ announces the error and aborts the protocol.
The remarkable property of this protocol is that any group of t or more principals can
call the conference. A s in the case of the Group M K T protocol, steps (5) and (6) of
the protocol are necessary only w h e n the share st+2 is not used.
A n attractive feature of the protocol is that principals can still join the conference
even if they are late (as long as they belong to the group defined by the underlying
secret sharing). A late-comer can join the conference if he/she has got a transcript of
the protocol. This mimics real conferences where all eligible participants can enter the
conference any time they wish.
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Let us discuss which security goals the protocol achieves. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that the protocol applies (l)-(4) steps only.
• Clearly the freshness of the key gs is asserted (arguments are the same as for the
group M K T ) .
• Key confidentiality holds. As commented in the proof of Theorem 7.2, the value
of the key can leak if the degree of f(x) < t.
• Threshold authentication is satisfied. In the first step of the protocol, the list
of t currently active principals is displayed on the public notice-board in the
form of their signed commitments. It is reasonable to expect that some active
principals will back d o w n from sending their commitments once they have seen
t commitments on display. After a successful run of the protocol, each active
principal knows t principals w h o displayed their commitments on the noticeboard.
• Key confirmation results from the fact that the secret key is verified using the
share sn+2 and knows that the key is shared with the group of active principals.
Note that a principal knows the identity of t members only (the whole group of
active principals is not known).
Consider the step (2) of the protocol. Note that if one principal fails to complete
the last round, the key m a y be recovered by trying all possible values for the missing
bit (note that length of it m a y be from single to several bits) and all principals will
be in more or less the same position as far as the difficulty of computing the key is
concerned.
Efficiency of M K T protocols is typically measured by both their communication
and computation overhead. W e assume that generation of a single signature costs one
exponentiation. T h e overhead for group and threshold M K T protocols is shown in
Tables 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.

7.6 Conversion of Threshold Schemes into MKT
Protocols

The previous section shows how secret sharing may be used in the context of multi-part
key transport. Note that each principal holds three shares. The first share (different

7.6. Conversion of Threshold Schemes into MKT

Protocols

102

Table 7.1: Communication and computation costs in group M K T protocols
Step
Communication
Computation
(per principal)
(per principal)
Registration
1 message
« n multiplications and
via secure channel
additions in GF(q)
1 exponentiation
1 broadcast
(1)
« n exponentiations
(2)
1 exponentiation plus
1 broadcast
(3)
1 hashing
n exponentiations plus
(4)
n hashing

Table 7.2: Communication and computation costs in threshold M K T protocols
Computation
Communication
Step
(per principal)
(per principal)
ss t multiplications and
1 message
Registration
additions in GF(q)
via secure channel
2 exponentiation plus
1 broadcast
(1)
1 hashing

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

£ broadcasts

1 broadcast

t exponentiations plus
t hashing
« t exponentiations
1 exponentiation
1 hashing
t exponentiations
1 hashing
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for each principal) is used to call on the conference. The second share (common for
all) is used to recover the c o m m o n secret. The third share (also c o m m o n for all) is
used to verify whether the secret coincides with the reconstructed polynomial. There
is, however, an intriguing question about more fundamental relation between secret
sharing and conference key distribution. In this Section we are going to show that an
arbitrary threshold scheme can be converted into a group M K T protocol from Section
7.4. Being more precise, w e assume that a group V = {Px,... ,P n } has been created
by a dealer w h o established a (t, n) Shamir secret sharing and distributed single shares
to the principals. Could they convert the secret sharing into a version of group M K T
protocol ? W e start from a theorem which illustrates how principals can split their
shares into sub-shares.
T h e o r e m 7.3 A (t,n) threshold Shamir scheme built in GF(qv) can be converted into
its linear equivalent over GF(q) where each share splits into v sub-shares.
Proof. To show this, denote shares in the scheme as Si = f(X{) where Xj G GF(qv)
is public. T h e underlying polynomial f(X) is of degree at most t. The relation between
shares and the polynomial coefficients (A0, M, • • •, At-\) is captured by the following
equation:

' s x'
s2 =

X x

_sn _

A0
Ax
=

.A ^

.

1

t-l

- A0

xx
x2

xi

X t-l

Ax

Xr

X t-l

At-,

(7.1)

The secret is /(0) = A0. T h e public matrix X has n rows and t columns and any
collection of t rows creates a nonsingular (Vandermonde) matrix. The arithmetics is
done in GF(qv)
in GF(q).

modulo an irreducible polynomial q(x) of degree v with coefficients

It is known [47] that any element from GF(qv) can be represented as a

vector where the basis is (1, a, a2,..., av~l) and a is the zero of the polynomial q(x)
or q(a) = 0. Consider Equation (7.1). If the vector (Sx,..., Sn) is represented using
the basis in GF(q") then $ = (5j,i,..., *,,) for t = 1,..., n. If the same is done for
the elements Ai e GF(qv); i = 0,..., t - 1, then A{ = K i , . . . , a^v) for i = 0,..., t-1.
The n x t matrix X is converted into a nv x tv matrix y where its entries from
GF(q) can be found from Equation (7.1). Being more specific, assume that the vector
(Si,..., Sn) over GF(qv)
GF(q).

is converted into its corresponding vector (sx,..., snv) over

Similarly, the vector (A0,Ax,...,At-X)

over GF(qv)

is written as a vector
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(ao, • • •, (hv-i) over GF(q).
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N o w w e are looking for a (nv x tv) matrix y such that
aQ

Sl

s2

Snv

= yx

ax

0<tv-l

The i-th column of y can be identified by taking the vector a® which consists of all
zeros except the i-th co-ordinate which is "1". The vector a(i) is now converted into
its equivalent vector A®

€ GF(qv).

T h e product X x A^ gives a (n x 1) vector over

GF(qv) which after conversion into GF(q) gives the i-th column of y.
T h e matrix y over GF(q)

is equivalent to the matrix X over GF(qv)

O
as far as

principals are using shares to recover the secret. The situation become a bit "tricky"
when principals are using sub-shares. O n e would expect that any tv sub-shares should
be enough to recover the secret. This is not the case for Shamir scheme. A n easy way
around this is to allow principals to agree on which sub-shares are to be used so the
secret can be reconstructed. This can be done quite easily as the matrix y is public.
Problems of sub-share handling can be avoided all together if (t, n) secret sharing
has been already designed to allow principals to divide shares into v sub-shares.
A (t, n) S h a m i r S c h e m e with v Sub-shares ([50])
Dealer: T h e dealer assigns v co-ordinates xil,...,Xiv to each participant Pi\ i =
1,..., n. Co-ordinates are different from 0,1,..., v — 1. These co-ordinates are
public. Next the dealer selects at random a polynomial f(x) — a0 + aix +
..., a^-ix^ - 1 where a{ eR GF(q) for i ~ 0,..., tv - 1. The polynomial f(x) is
of degree at most tv - 1. Finally, the dealer computes v sub-shares s^ = f(xij);
j = 1,..., v for the participant Pf, i = 1,..., n. The sub-shares are distributed
secretly to all corresponding participants. The secret is s = (/(0), f(l),..., f(v-

Combiner: Any group of participants who collectively pools tv sub-shares is able to
successfully run the combiner algorithm. The combiner knowing tv points, can
use the Lagrange interpolation to recover the polynomial f(x) and the secret
s=

(f(0),f(l),...,f(v-l)).

To simplify the notation, w e denote (t, n, v) Shamir scheme as the (t, n) Shamir scheme
with v sub-shares.
N o w w e are ready to present a version of the protocol in Section 7.4.
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Group M K T Protocol with Sub-shares
Assumptions: Given a (t,n) threshold scheme over V = {Pi,...,Pn} with polynomial f(x) over GF(qv).

Each principal Pj holds a share St = f(X{) where X{ is

public (i = 1,... ,n). Principals collect a fresh g from the public registry. T h e
key is gs = g^°\

Steps: 1. Pj divides her share into three collections of sub-shares Si = (siti, sit2, sit3)
such that #sitj = ^^

where #Sij stands for the number of sub-shares in

the collection Sjj; j = 1,2,3. Clearly, w e assume that v is divisible by 3.
2. Pi —»• • : Sj,!, i.e. Pi broadcasts her sub-shares from siA; i — 1,... ,t - 1
(broadcasting need not be authenticated). This step must be performed
by all principals in a fixed time interval. If the interval lapses and some
principals have failed to broadcast their shares, the protocol must be reinitialised by the T A .
3. Knowing vt—l public sub-shares and s^2, each principal Pj uses the Lagrange
interpolation andfindsg^x^. Pifirstverifies whether the collection of subshares Si j together with their public co-ordinates belongs to f(x). If it
does, the principal finds the secret key gs = # /(0) . Otherwise, P{ aborts the
protocol.
This protocol achieves the same collection of goals as the original one. However the
split of shares into sub-shares has some repercussions. Consider the following ones:
1. After n principals broadcast their shares the uncertainty about the secret is
H(s) = log 2 g v/3 (not the expected H(s) = \og2qv, so the effective secret is
shorter).
2. Each principal uses her o w n collection of sub-shares to recover the secret and to
verify its consistency with the polynomial f(x).
3. A misbehaving principal can broadcast the wrong number of sub-shares. If she
announces too few sub-shares, the secret will be undetermined. If, however, she
reveals too many, the confidentiality of the secret is lost. This feature is present
in all M K T protocols, as any principal after obtaining the secret can disclose a
part or the whole secret.
4. Principals can trade off the threshold for calling the conference with the ability
to verify the key. This m a y lead to a variant of the protocol in which shares, are
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divided into two sub-collections - one for broadcasting and the other for secret
recovery. Key confirmation and group authentication can be implemented as an
additional step in the protocol.

7.7 Conclusions
The trust structure incorporated into secret sharing can be used to establish a conference key. W e proposed two protocols. T h efirstone allows to call on a conference only
if all principals (the group) are active. T h e second protocol permits to run a conference
if at least t principals are active. T h e work is concluded by a general observation that
any threshold scheme can be converted into a M K T protocol. To do this it is enough
to drop the assumption about atomicity of shares.

Chapter 8
Extensions and Future Work
In this chapter w e discuss some possible extension for the previous chapters, point out
the future direction of our work and conclude the thesis.

8.1 Extensions
Tamura and Okamoto in [84] proposed a secret sharing scheme which has the following
properties:
1. the secret can be changed without changing the old shares.
2. it is easy to add and delete members.
3. it is easy to share multi-secret in a single share.
The drawback of this scheme is that the dealer needs to keep all the shares distributed at thefirsttime and responsible for choosing the new secret. T h e opponents
m a y only attack the dealer to get the shares than the scheme is broken.
In chapter 6, each participant is a dealer for his o w n secret sharing scheme so he
can keep all the shares. If one of the principal (under the attack) lost his shares, the
opponent still do not know the secret of the conference key because that the c o m m o n
key is a combination of all individual secrets. But when we want to reuse the shares,
a trust authority is needed for choosing a n e w generator for the new conference key.
W e can eliminate the need of trust authority from applying the protocol in [84] and
prevent the drawback of the protocol.

8.1.1 Changes for the Secret
The basic protocol for change the secret is below:
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T h e dealer chooses another secret K' with zero value of x coordinate ((0, AT')), and
use all n pairs of shares (XJ, s{), i = 1, 2,..., n to compute the new polynomial f'(x).
This f'(x) will become n + 1 degree. f'(x) = K' + &ix + 6 2 x 2 + ... + 6 n + ix n + 1 . The
dealer broadcast the coefficients from bt to bn+x. A n y £ of members can collectively to
reconstruct the new secret K' from the t shares and the broadcast coefficients. The
detail can refer to [84].
Every set of at least t participants can always form the following system of equations:
K' + bxxix + b2x2x + ••• + b^x^1

= siX - E J + 1 bjXix

K' + 6ixt2 + b2x22 + ••• + bt_xx\2l

= si2 - E J + 1 bjxa

K' + bxxit + b2x\ + ••• + bt^xl;1

= sit ~ E"= t bjxu

This can be written as:
*~1 \

/ 1

XJI

xiX

X il

1

Xj2

Xj2

X i2

\ 1 xit

'it

( K> \

t-l

x

it

bx

V
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( slX - EJ+ 1 ^ x n
Si2 ~ YTjtl bjXi2

^ "5it — 5Zj=t ^'Xit y

The leftmost matrix is a so-called Vandermonde matrix and its determinant is given
by the following formula:

detA=

YI (Xij-xik).
i<k<j<t

Since all Xj's are distinct, no term (xij - xik) is zero. Thus the determinant of a
Vandermonde matrix over afinitefieldis always non-zero and the above system of
equations has a unique solution over Zv. That is, every set of at least t participants
can uniquely reconstruct the polynomial and hence recover the secret.

8.1.2

R e u s e the Shares

W e give only the reuse of the shares part of protocol, the rest of protocol refer to
chapter 6.
To relieve the requirement of dealer in the reuse of protocol without change the
shares, we adapted the new secret sharing scheme in [84].
This part of protocol is done by each principal independently of each other. The
setup phase proceeds as follows:
1. Principal P{ uses the shares s\2J, j = 1,.. •, n and new secret {K'it0, 0) to construct
a new polynomial // = K'it0 + biAx + b^2x2 + ... +

b^n+xxn
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2. Further Pj prepares shares s'\^ = f'i(2j).
3. Pj prepares public shares /?',, = as>i>i for i = 1

n.

4. T h e principal Pj broadcasts BV to all principals j = 1,..., n and the coefficient
0i,n-l-l-

5. After Pj has obtained BV from other principals, she recovers n public shares

i=i

for j = l,...,n.
6. Pj uses n public shares and her secret share, Sj
S' = aF'w

to recover the c o m m o n secret

= as',F'(0) = £ if'j. Note that principals still use Lagrange inter-

polation but for exponents. For details h o w to compute S', the reader is referred

to [15].
7. Pi takes the secret S', her n a m e idi, and a timestamp TSj and prepares a string
£i = H(S'\\idi\\TSi) where if is a cryptographically strong, collision-free hash
function with a public description. T h e triplet (£i,idi,TSi) is broadcast (note
that broadcasting channel is assumed to provide authentication).
8. Pi collects (£j,idj,TSj) from other principals, checks their authenticity and verifies them using her o w n secret S'. If the checks hold, Pi is ready for the conference.
Otherwise, Pi announces the error and aborts the protocol.

8.2 Future Work
The conference key establishment protocol still has some basic problem to solve such
as efficiency problem. A s mention before, most of the previous proposed protocols were
the extension of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. These protocols need m a n y
rounds of communication between principals. T h e communication overhead depends
on the number of principals in conference, usually it is not too small.
In previous chapters, w e give some efficient protocols in order to reduce the communication overhead, but the computational-overhead still high.
Another problem is that the dynamic property of the conference. Usually the
principals of a conference can not be preset, they m a y be variable from time to time.
H o w to deal with the change of the principals in order to keep the freshness of the key
and the security of the new key is a challenging task.

8.3. Conclusions
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Conclusions

In this thesis, we first give an overview of cryptographic methods using in the conference key establishment protocol such as the public key cryptosystem, private key
cryptosystem, hashing, digital signature, and secret sharing schemes.
Secondly, w e present a short description of some previously proposed key establishment protocols. Most of the previously proposed key establishment protocols are
based on the extension of the Diffie-Hellman two-party key exchange protol for multiprincipal conference. T h e authentication of principals and efficiency of the protocol
are the most important problems.
Finally, w e proposed three protocols in chapter 5, 6, and 7, to solve the above
problem under different assumptions. In chapter 5, w e concentrate in reducing the
cost of message exchanged issue. T h e cost is reduced by using the message broadcast
instead of message transported through secure channel. In chapter 6, and 7, the secret
sharing scheme is used as a group authentication solution instead of individual principal
authentication. It also reduces the communication overhead between principals in
previous protocols.
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